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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Currently,

we

are facing globalization of the

World Market

as reflected in the

astonishing increase of multi-national corporations. Accordingly, cross-border transaction

of business

is

also

on the way of great increase

in

amounts and numbers. However, those

cross-border business transactions are to be subject of the regulation of foreign

government, and

From

this

tendency

is

especially true in the merger transaction.

the situation described above, businessmen with interest in establishing

transnational mergers will need to

know

the other party's governmental regulations as

well as those of their own. This task of becoming knowledgeable of transnational merger

laws

is

potentially complicated since there

regulation at this time.

their

own

many

is

no international standard of merger

Each country with merger regulations has developed them from

country's social, economical, and political necessities. Thus, one can expect

discrepancies, mismatches, and non-parallel regulations across countries and

communities

(e.g.,

European Community)

that will cause

problems during a merger

transaction. Therefore, the current situation does not leave

businessmen but

to

become knowledgeable on

prepare for a transnational merger.

policies,

economic
market.

activity,

and

to

promote

the other party's regulations

Depending on

each of the nations has developed

their

its

own

any other choice for those

own

their social, political,

legal

industries

system

when

they

economical

to prevent unfair

by regulating and controlling

their

Importance of the Paper and Purpose
This

is

especially true in the case of the four

economic bodies

that will be

discussed in this paper— European Union (hereinafter European Community), the United

South Korea, and Japan.

States,

I

will discuss the

development of competition laws

each of the countries and community, including merger regulation. As
in the paper, the

United States has the longest history

in the area

we

will

in

examine

of merger regulation as

well as competition law; and the other bodies, largely, have modeled their regulations

after those

of the United States. In the case of the European Community,

eight years since they have enacted the

EC

has been

Regulation on the Control of Concentration

between Undertakings,' although they had mostly

Rome

it

relied

on Articles 85 and 86 of the

Treaty' to control merger in their market. South Korea and Japan have

comparatively short histories concerning competition law and merger regulation.

Due

to

differences in the length of history of competition laws and merger regulations of the four

economic bodies, the task of comparative analysis
needed

in this

is

a difficult one, but that

which

is

changing global community.

The primary purpose of this paper
rules of merger control, focusing

is

comparing and contrasting those four

legal

on comparing two systems, those of the United States

and European Community, and furthermore comparing enforcement practices

in these

four different bodies.

'

Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on Control of Concentration between

amended by 1997 O.J. (L 180) [hereinafter Merger
Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treaty] arts. 85-86.

undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395)
'

1

,

as

1

Regulation].

CHAPTER II

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)
Background of Implementing Merger Regulation

On December 21,
Community

(hereinafter

as the

Rome

EEC) adopted

began

to

became

effective

inadequacy

its

on September 21, 1990.^ Before

in controlling

85 and Article 86 of the

Rome

EC

EEC

Treaty, also

and which have as

or distortion of competition within the

loophole

when

the Article 85

is

common

Treaty.'

between undertakings,

'

^

-

^

two

Merger Regulation, supra note

EC
C.

Treaty, supra note,

J.

EC

Cook

treat}',

&

arts. 85,

C. S. Kerse, E. C.

supra note,

art.

85.

may

affect trade

market."''

There

is

a considerable

applied to address merger in which, sometimes, two

accomplished, there will be no party that

at least

it

their object or effect the prevention, restriction

independent companies integrate to a single

must be more than

known

merger cases under the two

decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which

states

that

competition law. However,

Article 85 of the prohibition states that "all agreements

between member

Economic

on the concentrations between

which was the main source of the

be criticized for

articles. Articles

a regulation

were brought under Articles 85 and 86 of the

Treaty,''

1990

1989, the Council of Minister of the European

undertakings, and this regulation

time, merger cases

in

is

entity.^

That

is.

after a

merger

is

any longer independent. Assuming that there

parties in order for a case to be ruled under Article 85.

1

86

Merger Conikoi 2-5 (2d

ed. 1996).

it

is

not theoretically possible to bring a merger case under Article 85.*

Commission,

in it's

1996 memorandum, declared

85 to agreement whose purpose

is

The EC

that "it is not possible to apply Article

the acquisition of total or partial ownership of

enterprises or the reorganization of the of the ownership of enterprises (merger,

acquisition of holdings, purchase of part of the assets)."^

A landmark decision with respect to application of Article 85 to a merge

is

the

case of British American Tobacco Co./Reynolds Industries in 1987,'° in which Philip

Morris agreed to purchase stock of Rothmans Tobacco, Ltd. ("Rothmans"), a competing
cigarette manufacturer."

its

reached

in

Rothmans Tobacco

proceeding against Philip Morris, but settlement was

its

agreement to keep

Justice of the

31%

acquisition of 20.8% of stock gave Philip Morris

and 24.9% of the voting rights

interests

began

The

its

voting rights below

Ltd.'^ the

Commission

made when

25%." Even though

European Communities (hereinafter ECJ) found

of

Philip Morris

the Court of

that the behavior

Morris was not unlawful under competition law, the importance of this case

is

of Philip

that the

court determined that Article 85 can be used to address merger cases as long as the parties

at issue

remain independent

after the merger.''*

Paul-Henri Freret, The European Union Regulation on "Concentrations" and United States Merger

^

Z,aw5, 2 TuL.

J.

INTL

«S:

CoMP.

L. 143,

152(1964).

'Id
'

Memorandum on

the

Problem of Concentrations

in the

Common

Market, Competition Series, No.

3,

1966,^58.
'°

Joined Cases 142/84

&

156/84, British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd.

&

R.

J.

Reynolds/ Commission,

1987 E.C.R. 4487 (1987) [hereinafter Philip Morris]
"W. at 4493.
'^

Id
" Id
'''

at

4494.

at

4495-97.

See Baches Opi, Merger Control

States

'

in the

United States and European Union:

How Should the

Experience Influence the Enforcement of the Council Merger Regulation'^, 6

223,235(1997).

J.

United

Transnatl.

&

Pol'y

5

On

the other hand. Article 86, from

its

wording,

is

supposed

to control

abuse of

a dominant position. Article 86 prohibits "(a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a

dominant position within the

common

prohibited as incompatible with the

between Member
loophole making

lies

States."'^

it

market or

common

When the

in a substantial part

market

in so far as

may

it

affect trade

article is interpreted strictly, there also

appears a

impossible to apply this article to every merger case and the loophole

on the scope of Article

86.'*

That

is,

the article does not include the issue of the

creation of a dominant position. Therefore, Article 86 does not

merger regulation must be prohibitive with respect

However,

of it shall be

Continental

in

to creation

Can Co./ Commission

fulfill

the requirement that

of a dominant position.''

in 1973,

which

the

is

first

merger

case brought to the ECJ, the court applied Article 86.'^ In this case, the Continental Can, a

U.S. company, acquired

86%

of the shares

in

Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke

AG (hereinafter

SLW), a German

company.''' Later, with the financial help of

Continental Can),

SLW could acquire 91% of the shares in the Dutch Company,

Thomassen

&

Drijver-Verblifa (hereinafter TDV).^°

producer of packaging and mental closures, and

packaging material

'^

EC

'*

Cook

Trear>

&

art.

parent

SLW was the

TD V

company

largest

(here.

German

was a leading manufacturer of

in the Benelux.'^'

The Commission found
Article 86 of the

its

EC

that the behavior

of Continental Can was in violation of

Treatv because the behavior in which Continental Can. as the one

86.

Kerse, supra note

5, at 2-3.

''Id
'*

Case 6/72, Continental Can Co./Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215(1973) [hereinafter Continental Can].

'"Id

at

2 18.

^Ud

at

219.

at

219-20.

^'

Id

holding the dominant position, had acquired

subsidiary

its

80%

of the shares

(SLW), was an abuse of the dominant position

TDV

through

that Continental

its

Can had

before

acquisition at issue.^^

Continental

Can appealed

to the

ECJ, arguing

that Article

could not be used to rule over a merger case because a merger

The ECJ dismissed

a dominant position listed in Article 86.'^

the

in

Commission's decision, thereby confirming again

be ever distorted in the

its

is

86 of the

EC

Treaty

not the kind of abuse of

this

argument and upheld

position that competition cannot

Common Market.^^ By the decision

in

Continental Can, the

ECJ

established the idea that Article 86 can be applied to a merger case.^'

Nevertheless, Continental

of Ministers of the

it

was

rejected

EEC

Can

states

on the matter of merger regulation

Member

States.'^

which did not want

to the

to

submit to the Council

to yield their

EC Commission. ^^

finally the Council,

on the control of concentrations between

in Philip

own

sovereignty

After that time, the

the proposal several times, but each time,

However, the judgement

merger regulation, and

Commission

a proposal of adopting a cohesive merger regulation in 1973, but

by many member

Commission amended

inspired the

it

was

rejected by the

Morris pushed the Council

to

adopt a

on December 21, 1989, adopted the regulation

undertakings.'^^

Since the adoption of the merger regulation. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty will
not be applied to an agreement as far as the transaction will

'-

Id. at

220.

^^

Id. at

223-25.

^*

Id

242-45.

at

" Cook & Kerse, supra note 5,
" Opi, supra note 14, at 235.
^'Id

" Id

at

236.

at 2-5.

fall

within the scope of the

merger regulation. However,

Commission and ECJ or

if the

transaction

may

may

national authority

of the

Rome

Treaty

Scope

important and differing aspects of the merger regulation from that

lies in

concentration at issue

beyond the scope, the

apply those articles."

Jurisdictional

One of the most

fall

fall

exclusive application of the regulation.^" In other words, if a

within the scope of the merger regulation, the regulation allows

only the Commission to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the concentration, thereby
leaving no chance for jurisdiction to any of the

the contrary, does not

fall

Member

States.^' If the concentration,

within the scope of the merger regulation, the

Commission

on
is

excluded from exercising jurisdiction and national authorities of competition of each

member

states will

have jurisdiction over the concentration.^^

Depending on whether the Commission deals with a concentration or one of the

Member
is

States does, the result of the case

may

greatly differ."

very important to clarify which concentrations

fall

From

the reason above,

it

within the scope of the regulation

I

and which concentrations

fall

beyond

its

jurisdictional scope.

Not

all

concentrations are

addressed by the merger regulation. Rather, only those concentrations with community

i

dimension will be treated by the regulation.

^'

See Timothy G. Portwood, Mergers under

Series No. 7, 1994).
'''See id at 48-57.

'-

Id. at

57-59.

" See id
''Id

at

57-59.

EEC

'*''

First, the definition

Competition

of concentration will be

Law 45-60 (European Community Law

8
explained, and second, the threshold test to determine

community dimension

will be

introduced.

Definition of Concentration

The Merger Regulation uses
be more specific with

its

the

wording of the

word concentration
statute. Article 3

devoted to the definition of concentration.
control. ^^ Article 3(3) of the

instead of merger in order to

of the Merger Regulation

is

A concentration is a durable change of

Merger Regulation defines control as "the

exercising decisive influence on an undertaking."^^

possibility of

The change of control can be

exercised in the various ways. According to Article 3(1), a concentration occurs when:

(a)

Two

or

more previously independent undertakings merge,

already controlling at least one undertaking, or (b) one or

controlling at least one undertaking, or one or

or one or

more persons

more persons already

more undertakings

acquire, whether

by

purchase of securities or assets, by contract, or by any other means, direct or indirect
control of the

whole or

Also, the

parts of one or

Commission issued a

more other

undertakings.^^

notice called

"Commission notice on

the notion of

a concentration,""^* thereby providing the definition of concentration more in detail. The

following definitions are mostly excerpted from the Commission notice on the notion of

concentration.

'^

Morten

P.

Broberg, Merger Control in the European Community: A

Introduction of the Merger Regulation, 19

World

Competition-L.

&

Summary of the Five

Econ. Rev.

6,

Years since the

7(1995).

^^

Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
'*
Commission notice on the notion of concentration under the Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 1994 O.J. (395) [hereinafter
''

1

Notice on the Notion of Concentration].

9

Mergers between previously independent undertakings

.

A

merger within the

meaning of the Merger Regulation occurs where two or more undertakings combine
a

new

undertaking and cease to exist as different legal

undertaking

is

absorbed by another, the

entities, or

may

into

occur where an

latter retaining its legal identity

while the former

ceases to exist as a legal entity.^'

As
deemed

well as mergers on the legal basis, mergers on the de facto basis

as mergers within the

may

meaning of the regulation when the combined

be

activities

of

previously independent undertakings results in the creation of a single economic unit

while those undertakings retaining their individual legal personalities/"
Acquisition of control.

Regulation, a concentration

control, according to the

into

described in the point (b) of Article 3(1) of the Merger

may occur

Commission

in a case

Even

if

of acquisition of control. Acquisition of

notice on the notion of a concentration,

two forms of acquisition."" Furthermore,

legal basis

it

As

sole control

is

50%

divided

"normally acquired on a

where an undertaking acquires a majority of the voting

an undertaking acquired more than

is

rights

of a company.'"*^

of the share capital of a target company,

does not normally confer control unless the undertaking also acquired a majority of the

voting right of the target

"qualified minority",

basis refers a case in

company

.''^

Sole control

may be

which can be established on a
which

acquired in the case of a

legal and'or de facto basis."*^

A legal

specific rights are attached to the minority shareholdings,

thereby enabling minority shareholder to determine the strategic commercial behavior of

"M HI 6-7.
*"

Opi, supra note 14,

"'

Notice on the Notion of a Concentration, supra note 38, t

''Id.
''Id.

at

237.
13.

10
the target company.''^

The power

to appoint

more than half of the members of the

supervisory board or the administrative board

is

one of the examples/*

A de facto basis refers to a case in which the shareholder is highly

likely to

achieve a majority in the shareholders' meeting, because the remaining shares are so

widely dispersed that
be represented

it is

hardly expected

at the shareholders'

all

the smaller shareholders will be present or

meetings/^

Sole control can be exercised by a minority shareholder that has the right to

manage

the

company

activities or to

joint control to a sole control

is

determine

its

business

policy.'^*

A change from a

considered as a concentration in the meaning of the

Merger Regulation because "decisive influence exercised

solely

is

substantially different

to decisive influence exercised jointly.'"*''

On the

other hand, there

is

a joint control

where

"tu'o or

more undertakings have

the possibility to exercise decisive influence over another undertaking."^^ Here, decisive

influence

is

defined as "the power to block actions which determine the strategic

commercial behavior of an undertaking."^' Even though the clearest form of joint control
exists

where only two parent companies equally share the voting

company, joint control can
This

**

is

Id.\

the case in

14.

""Id.

''Id
''Id

'"Id^
'°Id^

16.
19.

^•/^.

"M 111120-21.

also exist even

where there

is

rights

of the target

no equality of voting

which minority share holders have additional

rights."

rights so that they are

n
able to veto decisions "which are essential for the strategic commercial behavior of the

join venture."^''

Some examples of the

veto rights are decisions about "the budget, the

business plan, major investments or the appointment of senior management."^''

Community Dimension
The Commission can apply

the

Merger Regulation only

which have the Community dimension."
the

Commission

to the concentrations

In order to give a clear-cut guidance

will apply the regulation, the

community dimension

is

of whether

based on the

turnover of the undertakings concemed.^^ The Merger Regulation provides five thresholds

which the concentration must meet

to

have a Community dimension."

First, the

combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned must be more
than

ECU 2,500 million.^^

Second, in each of at least three

Member

States, the

aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned must be more than

million.^'' Third, in

each of the three

Member

ECU

100

States included for the purpose of second

threshold, the aggregate turnover of each of at least

must be more than

ECU

combined

two of the undertakings concerned

25 million.^" Fourth, the aggregate Community-wide turnover of

each of at least two of the undertakings

is

more than

ECU

100 million.^' Lastly, when

each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate

''

"'

Id.

Id.

II

22.

H 23.

^^

Merger Regulation, supra note

''"

See Morten

P.

" Merger Regulation, supra note
''Id

'"Id

'"Id
"'Id

1

,

art.

2 (2).

Broberg, supra note 35,

1

at 10.

I, art. 3.

12

Community-wide turnover within one and

the

same Member

States, the concentration

does not have Community dimension."

The Council broadened

the scope of the Regulation by lowering the thresholds,

thereby enabling the Commission to exercise

thresholds are

ECU

Community-wide

much broader jurisdiction. The

5,000 million world-wide turnover and

ECU

250 million

turnover, and the second and third thresholds are

through the amendment in 1997.^^

Now, many

caught by national merger authorities will

fall

original

newly adopted

concentrations which

would have been

within the sole jurisdiction of the

Commission.
It

must be noted

amount of turnover and

that the

Community dimension

the location of the turnover.^'*

world-wide turnover threshold and

1

is

considering two factors, the

From

the

00 million Community-wide turnover threshold,

clear that the regulation will not be applied to a concentration

certain size (world-widely

meet a certain
that

size in the

was intended

and Community-widely) nor

will not

be applied

if

See Cook

&

'^

See id

62-66, 72-74.

'-

See id

'^

Merger Regulation, supra note

at

Kerse, supra note

5, at

61-62.

1, art.

3(d).

test

Community

it

is

to a

which does

of Community turnover

market.^^ Also, the

each of the undertakings concerned achieves

more than two-thirds of its turnover within one and

"^

which does not reach

to a concentration

world market but does not meet the

to reflect a potential to affect the

Merger Regulation

ECU 2,500 million

the

same Member

States.

*'*'

As

a result

13

of this

if

test,

a merger between the two largest

company can be

each of them achieves mostly within the same

Joint Venture-Distinction

With regard

Member

States.^^

Between Cooperative And Concentrative

to the joint venture, the Article 3(2)

creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis

economic

subject to a national filing

Joint Venture

of the Regulation states that "the

all

the function of an

entity shall constitute a concentration"^* within the

autonomous

meaning of the Merger

Regulation. Also, the Article 2(4) reads that "[t]o the extend that the creation of a joint

venture constituting a concentration pursuant to Article 3 has

its

object or the effect the

coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings that remain independent, such

coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Article 85(1) and (3) of

the treaty, with a

view

to establishing

whether or not the operation

is

compatible with the

Common Market."^^
The Merger Regulation

is still

whether they are concentrative and
cooperative and therefore

is

sometimes very

because there

is

fall

difficult to

distinguishing between joint ventures depending on

fall

under the Merger Regulation, or they are

under the application of Article 85(1) and

draw

a line

in

R&

D. production or distribution.^"

December, 1994, published a notice on the

between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures

''^

See Cook

"*

Merger Regulation, supra note

'"

Id

art. 2(4)^.

it

a great variance in joint ventures, ranging from merger-like operations to

For the above reason, the Commission,

&

However,

between these two types of joint ventures

cooperation for particular functions such as

distinction

(3).

Kersk, supra note

5, at

64.

I. art.

3(2).

in order to

provide

14
guidance as to
before

its

how the Commission

change

to the Article 3(2)

deemed

to

basis, all the fianctions

of an autonomous economic

on the same market, and

in order for a joint

to

do

not a fiill-function venture

so, the joint venture

if

activities

entity.'" In

other words, the joint

the functions normally carried out by other undertakings

all

other resources including finance,

companies' business

of the Merger Regulation,

be concentrative, the joint venture must perform, on a lasting

venture must be performing

is

of the Merger Regulation

in relation to joint ventures."

According
venture to be

interprets Article 3

it

staff,

and

must have

assets. ^^

sufficient financial

The notice reads

that a joint venture

only takes over one specific function within the parent

without access to the market. The notice interprets the

term "on a lasting basis" as a condition in which the duration of a joint venture

to

and

is

enough

change the structure of the undertaking concerned.'^

Compatibility Test

Article 2 of the regulation provides that "[a] concentration

which creates or

strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be

significantly

impeded

incompatible with the

the

common

in the

common

Commission and ECJ

market or

market."

interpret "a

'

in a substantial part

Therefore,

it

is

of it

shall

most important

be declared

to look at

how

dominant position" and what kinds of factors are

^"

Commission Notice on the Distinction between Concentrative and Cooperative Joint Ventures Under
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Bet\\een
Undertakings, 1994 O.J. (C 385)
''

''

Id.;

1

[hereinafter Notice on the Distmclion].

Cook & K.erse, supra note 5. at 46-55.
Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 47-50.

see also

See also

''

Id

^'

Notice on the Distinction, supra note 70, \

1

6.
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taken into account to access to a dominant position. Furthermore,

when determining

whether or not a proposed merger creates or strengthens a dominant position,

it is

also

necessary to properly define the product and geographic market where a concentration

may

cause harm.

Defining The Relevant Market

The Merger Regulation does not provide any
the relevant product market. ^^

clear guidelines as to

Only section 6 of the form

CO

Regulation states that "[a] relevant product market comprises

services

which

are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable

define

annex of the

in the

all

how to

those products and/or

by the consumer, by

reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.""" Therefore,

is

clear the

Commission have taken

into account a cross-elasticity

defining a relevant product market. ^^

The

it

of demand when

factor to be taken into account needs to

be

explained more in detail with cases which reflect the pragmatic tendency of the

Commission
First

as well as the

ECJ.

of all, as shown

in the section 6

of the form CO, physical characteristics of

the product and intended end-use will be considered.^'' In other words, if two products

have so different physical characteristics that they cannot be expected to be used for the

same end-use, those products

''''

Merge Regulation, supra note

^''

Opi. supra note 14.

77

Form

(L 385)

CO
1,

at

1, art.

2(3).

248.

Relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to regulation

Annex. Form

CO

'*

Opi, supra note 14,

^^

PoRTWOOD, supra note 29,

''Id

are not substitutable and belong to different markets. ''^ For

at

lists

249.
at

(EEC) 4064/89, 1994

data required for the notification of a concentration.

66-68.

O.J.
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example,
the

in Renault/Volvo,^^ the

Commission

two companies of 45% shareholdings

Commission noted

that the truck

five tons;

tons/^

The commission noticed

market was subdivided into three submarkets:

that the

by

each other's bus and truck businesses. The

trucks between five and sixteen tons; and

below

(ii)

in

dealt with the reciprocal acquisition

main mechanical

(iii)

(i)

trucks

trucks above sixteen

characteristics of the trucks,

such as the type of engines, the number of axles, and the type of trailers, were different/^

The

technical aspects of the upper range were

more sophisticated because

the

requirements of durability and operating costs were greater than those for the
intermediate range/'' Trucks above sixteen tons were used in long haul, construction, and

long-distance distribution

traffic.^'

Furthermore, marketing conditions of trucks were

influenced by these technical differences/^

However,

in

most

cases, this criterion of physical characteristics

and intended end-use alone, cannot be expected

to

of the product

be enough to define a relevant product

market because certain products with very different physical characteristics and end-use

may

be demanded as a substitute by consumers while products with very similar

characteristics

and end-use may be demanded for different purposes/' For example, a

certain type of chemical product might be

is

also

demand from pharmaceutical

*'

Case IV/M004, Renault'Volvo, 1990

'-

See

id.

H

^^Seeid.\
*'

9.

10.

Id

''Id

"Id
*'

See Opi, supra note

**

See id

14, at

250.

O.J.

demanded by

industry/*

(C 281)

2.

a cosmetic industry while there

17

Also,

is

it

characteristics

necessary to examine consumer preference along with product

and

end-use.*"^

There might be a case

in

which even though physical

and end-use of two products are so similar as

characteristic

may

those products

not be considered to belong to the

to

be deemed interchangeable,

same market because consumers

strongly prefer one specific type of products over the other.'" In Nestle/Perrier,^^ the

Commission excluded
preference.'"^

soft drink

from the market definition, based on consumer

The Commission noted

consumed because of its image

that bottled spring water

as a natural product and

cleanliness, absence of contamination,

conclusion, the

Commission took

and a healthy

its

style

was bought and

regularly

association with purity,

of life.'^ In order to reach that

into account three factors: preference

of final

consumers; purchasing pattern of final consumers: and level of per capita consumption,

which was higher

for bottled spring water than for soft drinks.'"

Sometimes, the Commission also has taken
substitutability to define a relevant product

Commission may look

into account supply side

market along with other

at the possibility for a

factors'^ the

manufacturers of a certain product which

is

not part of the relevant market to switch to producing products which are considered as

''Mat 25 1-53.
"^

See id
" Case I V/M 190, Nestle/ Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L 356)
mineral water

in

1.

The

transaction in the case concerned bottled

France; Nestle would acquire Perrier and, as part of the deal, would sale the Volvo source

of Perrier to BSN, a competitor.

Id.

"'Id
''Id
"'

ld*i 10-12.
' PORTwooD, supra note 29,

at

66

^ 10.
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belonging to the relevant market, in a short period of time and without incurring
additional expenses or risks.'^

Of course,
so far introduced

there are

when

many

other factors to be taken into account along with factors

establishing a relevant product market (such as price difference,

conditions of competition...,

etc.).^^

The Commission and ECJ

product market after taking into account

all

the factors

all

will define a relevant

together on the case-by-case

basis.'^

On the

contrary to the relevant product market definition, the merger regulation

provides a definition for the relevant geographic market in Article 9(7): the relevant

geographic market consists of an area "in which the undertakings concerned are involved
in the supply

and demand of products or services,

in

which the conditions of competition

homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring

are sufficiently

areas

because, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those
areas. "^^ Also, the article reads that the assessment should take into account, in particular,

the nature and characteristics of the products or services concerned, the existence of entry

barriers or

consumer preference, price

difference, and/or appreciable differences of the

undertakings' market shares between the area concerned and neighboring areas.

On the

other hand, from the pragmatic aspect the

revealed that the

may sound

**

See

id.

''

See

id, at

^ Merger

Commission has taken

'°°

Commission has developed,

into account the following factors [although

it

is

it

similar to the definition in Article 9(7)]: the existence of regulatory barriers to

66-68.

Regulation, supra note

1, art.

9(7).
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market interpenetration; national procurement policies; cross-border imports;
distribution

and marketing infrastructure; transportation

costs;

consumer preferences;

potential competition in the market; price differences; differing market shares; language;

and differing local specific requirements."" That

is,

the

whether or not legislation can constitute an absolute or

between different countries or geographic

Commission takes

partial barrier preventing trade

areas. "^^ This criterion also appears in the

regulation. '°^ For example, with regard to the pharmaceutical industry, the

once found that markets
legal

in the pharmaceutical industry

were national due

framework under which the industry operates. '"^ There

procurement policy where a government or
industry and, as a result,

all

products which

its

is

Commission

to the very tight

also a national

departments are monopolizing a specific

purchases are being done through domestic suppliers.

Transportation cost also

geographic market.'°^ This

into account

is

may

play an important role in assessing a relevant

especially true

may accompany

'°^

when

the products concerned are low-cost

significant transportation costs, such as sugar, cement,

beer, or water because producers situated close to the

consumers

will

have a cost

advantage compared to remote manufacturers."^^ As to the percentage that transportation
costs

must represent

in order to constitute

an entry

barrier,

it is

assessed on a case-by-case

'°'

Opi, supra note 14, at 262.

'"^

See

'°'

Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(7).
Set? Opi, 5wpra note 14, at 262 (citing the case of Sanofi/Sterling Drug, 1991

"*^
'°'

id.

Id. at

263-64.

"^ See id at 265.
'°'

See id

O.J.

(C 156)

10,

t

17).
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basis.

'°^

In conclusion,

what

Commission dealing with a

criterion will be used or not is mostly

depending on the

specific case.'°^

Dominant Position
After finding a relevant market and measuring market shares of the undertakings

concerned, the Commission will examine whether or not a concentration creates or
strengthens a dominant position and also, if there

in the

common

of the

EC

whether or not effective competition

market would be significantly impeded as a result of the dominant

position. "° Unfortunately, the

position."'"

is,

Merger Regulation does not define "a dominant

However, since the concept of dominance was imported from the Article 86

Treaty,

Court of Justice

it

in

is

possible to define "a dominant position" ,as defined by European

United Brands Co./Commission^^^ in 1978, as "a position of economic

strength enjoyed by an undertaking

effective competition

which enables

it

to hinder the

on the relevant market by allowing

it

to

maintenance of

an appreciable extent

independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of its consumers."""^

Although
will not

exceed

recital 15

of the preamble of the Merger Regulation provides that there

be a dominance where the market share of the undertakings concerned does not

25%

either in the

Common

Market or

in a substantial part

impossible to provide any meaningful guideline concerning

'°''

See

id. at

of it,

it

is

virtually

how much market

shares will

265.

'"'See id. at 26 \-6S.
"° See PoRTWOOD, supra note 29, at 85-86.
'''See id
"•

See Case 27/76. United Brands Co.

&

United Brands Continental BV/Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207,

[1978] C.M.L.R. 429.
'

'^

See

id. at

277; Opi, supra note 14,

at

272.
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be enough to establish a dominance."'' Even, the Commission has taken pragmatic

approaches depending on cases. "^ However,

When

Commission's practice."^
market share

it

may be

possible to find hint from the

a concentration holds less than

in the relevant market,

25% of the combined

impediment of effective competition

compatibility will be presumed."^ If the market share ranges between

finding of a dominant position

share ranges between

40%

is

25%

very rare, but not totally impossible."*

and 69%, the Commission

is

is

above 70%, a dominance

Commission

are important

stated in Alcatel/Telettra}'^^ however,

considered, rather there are other

dominance.'"' For instance, the

many

in

When

of
the

presumed."^

indium of dominance as the

market shares are not only factor

factors to be taken into account

EC Commission

the market

will look into the existence

will be strongly

The market shares of undertakings

and 39%, a

When

actual and potential competitors of merging firms along with other factors.

market share

not likely and

to

be

when determining

de Havilland^^^ noted that a high

market share could indicate the existence of a dominant position only where the market
share persists over time. Thus, persistence of power over certain period will be taken into

"''

Opi, supra note 14,

at

274

'''Id.
117

See

id.

at

274-78; see also Lisa A. Barbot, Tracing the Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of

European Union Competition Policy Concerning Transnational Mergers, 2 Yul.

J.

Int'l

&

Comp.

L. 235,

274(1994).
'''Id

'"Id
'-°

Case IV/M. 042, Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48. The Commission stated

of any market share could indicate that a dominant position exists."

Id.

that "a very high share

f^ 38-40.

'-'

See

''^

Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. The Commission stated: "In general terms, a

Freret,

supra note

7, at

154-61.

concentration which leads to the creation of a dominant position

common

market

...

if

may however

there exists strong evidence that this position

is

be compatible with the

only temporan, and would be quickly

eroded because of high probability of strong market entry. With such market entry the dominant position
not likely to significantly impede effective competition within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger

is

22
account

when determining

a dominance.

The Commission

existence of current or future competitors which

significantly high market share

Commission

prevent an undertakings with a

from acting independently

in the market.

The

stated in Tetra-Pak/Alfa-LavaP^ that "in certain rare circumstances

such a high market share

may

may be

even

not necessarily result in dominance. In particular, if

sufficiently active competitors are present

market share

may

also takes into account

on the market, the company with the large

prevented from acting to an appreciate extent independently of the

pressures typical of a competitive market."'^''

The Commission

also takes into account the maturity of the market and

commercial or technical advantage over competitors.''^
market share of undertakings
a high market share

is in

in a

mature market

is

If the

more

market

is

mature, a high

likely to confer

dominance than

a highly innovative and rapidly changing market. '^^ Also, where

an undertaking possesses a technical advantages over competitors owing to

its

secret

technology or a patent, the Commission consider this as one of most criterion in
accessing a dominant position.''^ In

the acquisition

Du

Pont/ICL^'^^ in

would have increased Du Font's marker share between

Commission found

that

Du

'-'

it

is

23%

that

and 40%, the

Font's acquisition of ICI, particularly in the field of sensitive

Regulation. In order to assess whether the dominant position

competition therefore,
'-'

which the Commission found

...

necessarv' to assess the likelihood of

is

likely to significantly

new

impede effective

entry into the market."

Id.

\ 53.

Case 1V/M180, Tetra Pak/Alfa-Lavel, 1991 O.J. (L 290) 35.
Id.

1 3(3); See also Case 1V/M042. Alcatel/Telettra. 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.

merger even though the post-merger amounted

to a

The Commission cleared

the

market share of 83% of Spanish microwave equipment.

The Commission found that entry barriers were not very high and the main competitors of Alcatel in SpainAT&T and Ericsson- were considered to be capable of increasing production within a short period of time.
Id 51-53.
''"

See

Freret,

supra note

7, at

1

59-60.

''"

See id

'-'

See

'-'

Case IV/M 214, Du Pont/ICI, 1993

id.

O.J. (L 7) 13.
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nylon carpet fiber industry, would have provided

and

lead,

Pont the

its

Pont with a great technological
existing customers and given

Du

behave independently of its competitors.'^^ The concentration was

finally cleared after

bring

would have strengthened of its

this, in turn,

ability to

Du

Du

Pont promised to give up to

post-merger share

down below

the

sell sufficient

dominance threshold.

production capacity to
'""^

Besides those described above, there are other factors which the Commission
will take into account

when determining dominance, such

ECJ

as entry barrier, the existence

of gaps of market share between a dominant undertaking and

its

main

competitor...,

etc.'^'

There

is

also a political factor

dominant position and

which the Commission consider when assessing a

compatibility.''''

The Commission and ECJ may take

into account

the development of technical and

economic progress.'" According

preamble of the Regulation

required to take into account the legal framework of the

,

is

it

achievement of the fundamental objectives which was referred
Treaty, including that of strengthening the

In addition, the

is

'""

to

in Article 2

Community's economic and

Merger Regulation confirms

this

Commission's

Freret,

supra note

7, at

159.

/a'. H 48.
Barbot, supra note

'"

See

id.

'"

See

id.

&

1

17, at

274-75.

''''

See Cook

'^'

Merger Regulation, supra note

Kerse, supra note

5, at
1

,

131-33.

art.2(

1

)(b).

of the

of the

EC

social cohesion.'^''

position, provided that "it

consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition."'^'

"° 5ee
'^'

to recital 13
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With regard

to oligopolistic

any wording, and there

was found

is

dominance, the Merger Regulation does not provide

only one case, Neslle/Perrier,^''^'

to exist.'" In this case, the

create a duopolistic

in

which collective dominance

commission considered

dominance which might

significantly

impede the effective

competition in the market, given the high market share that Nestle and

after the

Merger between Nestle and

Perrier. Nestle

and

would

that the transaction

BSN

BSN

would have

both argued that the

Regulation does not apply to oligopolistic dominance.'^* Nevertheless, the Commission

concluded that the Regulation should apply equally
or collective power.'^^ Later, the

certain conditions

to the creation

Commission allowed

and obligations.

of single firm power

the transaction to proceed

on

'''^

Procedural Aspects

Pre-Mer^er Notification

The Merger Regulation

Community dimension

requires that concentrations with a

be notified to the Commission not more than one week after the conclusion of the
agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling

""

Case IV/M 190, Nestle/Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L 356) \\see also supra note 91
"' See Pierre Raoul-Duval ET AL., The EEC Merger Control Regulation, SB04
(

1

996); Cook.

&

Kerse;, supra note

5, at

1

34- 36; Portwood, supra note 29,
1

at

ALI-ABA

357, 365-66

79-85; see also Opi, supra

note 14, at 277-78.
''*

See PoR-nv'ooD, supra note 29,

at

81,82

"" Id
'''^'

in

The Commission only allowed

the

merger on condition

that Nestle sell off eight

brands of mineral water

a single package to a third party' in order to create a third force in the mineral water market in France

which

will, in turn,

challenge the duopolistic dominant position of Nestle and

be approved by the Commission so that the

latter

BSN. This

third party

had

could ensure that the purchaser had sufficient financial

resources and expertise to be an effective competitor on the French market.

Id. at

148.

to
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interests,

whichever comes

first.''"

In case of true merger, within the

3(1 )(a), or in case of an acquisition of joint control, within the

meaning of Article

meaning of Article

3(1 )(b),

a concentration shall be notified by the parties jointly. In other cases, the notification

shall

be made by the acquiring party. '''^ The Commission

from

ECU

1,000 to 50,000

if parties

obliged to notify

may impose
do

fail to

fines,

ranging

so. In addition, if the

parties concerned supply incorrect of misleading information in a notification, they

be subject to the fines of the same amount. '""^ Not
with the

Common Market, will

As soon
first

as the

it

until a transaction

has been declared

be realized in accordance with Article

Commission receives a

notification,

phase examination and decide whether or not

it

will

it

may

7(1).'''''

must proceed a so-called

approve the merger

at issue

within a month.'"' The Commission will look the concentration as belonging to one of the

following situation:

(a) the notification

does not

fall

within the scope of this Regulation;

(b) the concentration notified, although falling within the scope

does not raise serious doubts as to
concentration notified

to

its

'"

'"^

common

commission

Merger Regulation, supra note
Id.

will,

market.'''^

Where

market; (c) the

the notified concentration belong

by means of decision, record

that the concentration

4(1).

1, art.

an. 4(2).

Article 14(l)(a)-(b).

The Commission

may impose

also

fines if the parties

business record or refuse to submit an investigation by the Commission.
'"'

common

within the scope of the Regulation and raises serious doubt as

compatibility with the

to situation (a), the

'"-

falls

compatibility with the

its

of the Merger Regulation,

Before

its

amendment

in

1997, three weeks suspension

could not put into effect within the

first

three

was

weeks following

concerned supply incomplete

Id. art.

14(

1

)(c)-(d).

applied, in other word, a concentration
its

notification.

See Portwood, supra note

29, at 141-43.
'"*"

Merger Regulation, supra note

State, this time-limit
^'^

Id

art.

6(l)(a)-(c).

is

1,

art 10(1).

extended to six weeks.

When
Id.

there

is

a request for referral of the case to a

Member

26
does not have Community dimension.'"^
category

with the

(b), the

Commission

common market.''*^

If the concentration notified falls within the

will decide not to

In addition, the

oppose

it

and will declare

Commission may declare

it

compatible

the concentration

compatible under certain conditions which the undertakings concerned must comply

As

with.''*''

to the concentration in the category (c), the

proceedings which

is

Commission

will decide to initiate

also called second-phrase examination, and this procedure

four months while the first-phase

may

last

up

In the second-phase examination, the

to only

one month.

Commission

concerning the concentration

Commission

at issue.'"

opportunity to submit their observation.

a statement of objections

observation.'^''

on which the

last

'^°

will carry out a close

examination of the concentration in liaison with the competent authorities of the
States.'" After this examination, the

may

will prepare a statement

Member

of objections

Then, the parties concerned will have
'^^

The Commission can base

parties

had opportunity

to

its

decision only on

submit their

Next, a draft decision by the Commission will be prepared, based on the

objections and the observations, and this draft decision, in turn,

is

submitted for

discussion to the Advisory Committee which consists of one or two representatives of the

Member

'''Id
•''

'''

art.

States.'" After this discussion, the Advisor>'

6(l)(a).

Id. art. 6(

1

)(b).

Id

''"Id

art.

6(l)(c).

''Id

art.

19(2).

"Id

art. 18.

"'Id

art.

18(3).

"'

Id

15?

Merger Regulation, supra note

1, art.

19(3).

Committee

will deliver

an opinion

27

on the Commission's

makes a

draft decision.

final decision.

On

the basis of this opinion, the

Commission

'^''

The Commission

supposed

is

to

make

a decision normally within one

month

or, in

case of initiating the second-phase procedure, within five months including the first-phase

period.'" If the

Commission does not take a decision within

concentration will be

deemed

to

be compatible with the

The Commission exercise exclusive power on
part of the

the period fixed for

common

the matters.

market.
'^^

attach to

that the undertakings

vis-a-vis the

its

Article 8 deals with

that the

decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure

concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into

Commission with a view

common market. "'^°

the

'^^

Commission's power of decision. The Merger Regulation provides

Commission "may

it,

to rendering the concentration

compatible with the

Also, if undertakings has already implemented a concentration

without previously notifying the Commission of their intention to merge or to acquire

shares in another undertakings, the

Commission has power

to require,

by decision, the

post-merger undertakings or acquired assets to be separated or joint control to be ceased,

and also has power

to take

any appropriate action necessary

Commission may revoke

effective competition."'' Besides, the

if the

decision

"'/a', art.

is

to restore conditions

based on incorrect information which

at least

its

of

compatibility decision

one of the parties

19(4)

'''Id. art. 10(1)(3).

"'/£/. art. 10(6)
^-^
""^'

"''

See PoRTU'ooD, supra note 29.

Merger Regulation, supra note

at

Id

If the parties

1

30-3

1, art.

1

8(2).

concerned, either intentionally or negligently put into effect the transaction during

suspension period, the Commission

"may by

turnover of the undertakings concerned. Id

decision impose fines not exceeding 10

art.

7(2)(b).

As

to the concentrations

% of the aggregate

which was not

notified,

28

concerned

is

responsible for or if the information

of the Regulation provides that the Commission

Governments and competent

authorities of the

was obtained by

may

deceit.'" Article

1

require information from the

Member

and from undertakings or

States,

association of undertakings.'"

Although the Commission possesses exclusive power
compatibility, there

is

ECJ have

a limit. Thus, the

Commission's decision including

fines

in the decision

of

unlimited jurisdiction to review the

and periodic penalty payments. The ECJ "may

cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty

payments

imposed."'^'*

Negotiation Between the Commission and Undertakings

If a concentration notified falls within the jurisdictional

scope of the Commission,

and has a significant possibility of impeding the effective competition

in the

common

market, the Commission will not approve the concentration. However, the Merger

Regulation

is

providing an opportunity for undertakings to be given clearance decision by

way which

adapting the concentration in the

the

Commission

put. Article 6(1 )(a)

and

Article 8(2) are dealing with those opportunity. Thus, a concentration, otherwise will be

declared incompatible with the

common

market, will be cleared by modifying the

concentration by entering into commitments. Nestle/Perrier

is

one of the important

decision concerning the commitments.'^'^

the

Commission may

either deal with the case itself of refer the

competition authorities of the
'*=

Id. art. 8(5)(a).

'"

Id

art.

1

"^ Id

art.

16.

Member

states.

art.

the part of the case to the

9(3).

1

Commission

The Merger Regulation
shall

also provides that "Subject to review

have sole jurisdiction

to take the decisions

21(1).
'*

Id

whole or

See PoRTwooD, supra note 29,

at

138-39.

provided for

by the Court of Justice, the

m

this

Regulation." Id

art.

29
In the case

of Nestle/Perrier,^^^ the Commission cleared the merger only on the

condition that Nestle

off eight brands of mineral water in a single package to a third

sell

party in order to create a third force in the mineral water market in France, thereby

creating a condition to challenge the duopoly of Nestle and BSN.'^^ This third party had

to

be approved by the Commission so that the Commission could ensure that the

purchaser had sufficient financial resources and expertise to be an effective competitor on
the French market. '^^

any share

The settlement was reached, thereby denying
market for ten years.

in the relevant

Perrier the right to

buy

'^^

Exception to the Sole Jurisdiction by the Commission

The Merger Regulation provides

the

Commission with

sole jurisdiction to take

decisions, only subject to review by the Court of Justice.'^" Furthermore, the regulation

provides that "[n]o

Member

State shall apply

its

national legislation

on competition

to

any consideration that has a Community dimension. '''^'However, there are three
exceptions to this principle, which are

known

as the

German, English and Dutch

clauses."'^

According

known

to Article 9, also

as the

German

clause, the

competent authorities of the

refer a notified concentration to the

Commission may

Member

State where,

within three weeks of its receiving of the copy of the notification from the Commission,

the

Member

State notify the

'"'^

Nestle/Perrier, 1992 O.J.

'"'

PoRTWOOD, supra note 29,
See id

'^«

(1

356)

at

See id

'^"

Merger Regulation, supra note
art.

'" For

that "a concentration threatens to create or to

1.

138-39.

'"'

'"/^.

Commission

1

,

art.

2

1

(

1

).

21(2)

more

detail information, see

PORTWOOD.

supra note 29,

at

50-59.
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strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be

significantly impeded"''^

Commission agrees
the case itself or

the

Member

that

may

on a

distinct

market within that

Member

such a distinct market and a threat

refer the

whole or

States concerned, with a

exist,

part of the case to the

view

to the application

State.

it

may

'^^

If the

either deal with

competent authorities of

of that State's national

competition law.'^^

Article 21,

known

Community dimension
Article allows

Member

to

as the English clause, opens a

way

for a concentration with a

avoid the exclusive application of the Regulation.'^'' This

States to take appropriate

measure

to protect "legitimate interests"

other than those considered by the Regulation, provided that they are compatible with the

general principles and other provisions of the

interests include "public security, plurality

According
request of a

itself deal

to Article 22,

Member

known

if the

law.'" Those legitimate

of the media and prudential

as the

Dutch

clause, the

State or at the joint request of two of more

with the transaction without a

Regulation,

Community

Commission

rules.

"'^^

Commission,

Member

at the

States,

Community dimension, applying

the

may

Merger

finds that the transaction, by creating or strengthening a

dominant position, has significant impeding of effective competition within the Member
State of States

''^

making

the joint request.'"

Merge Regulation, supra note

1, art.

The Commission

9(2)(a).

'''Id. art. 9(1),(2).
"-

W

art.

9(3).

''*5eeRaoul-Duval
'^'

et al.,

5wpra note 137,

Merger Regulation, supra note

"* Id.

''"Id

art.

22(3)

1, art.

at

369-70.

21(3).

is

allowed to take only the

)
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measures
territory

strictly

of the

necessary to maintain or restore effective competition within the

Member

States or states concerned.

'^°

Remedies
In general, there are

two types of remedial measures available under the Merger

Regulation and those measures are "divestiture" and "separation of joint control."'*'
Full divestiture calls for selling off and/or redistribution of the acquired assets or

undertaking from the purchaser and their recovering as an efficient and independent

competitor in the market.'^' Divestiture can result in a range from a few to too

number of transactions.'*^ For example,

the original seller can be offered with an option

to repurchase its interests, and/or the plant

and equipment could be sold off to an

independent undertaking.'*'^ Separation of joint control

for joint ventures

many

is

an efficient remedial measure

and similar situation such as cross directorship and cross

shareholdings.'*' This involves changes in voting right,

redistribution of capital

management

bodies, or

between parent undertakings.'*^

Besides those two remedial measures introduce above, the Commission

may

take

any of the following actions:
ordering partial divestiture of the target

1

company

in the

hands of acquiring

company;
2)

'""'/cy.

art.

ordering sterilization measures that permit acquisition of the challenged

22(5).

'*'

See PoRTwooD, supra note 29,

''-

See id

'^^

See id

"^

See id

"^

See id

''"

See id

at 152.
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ownership with

restriction

on

its

voting or managerial rights that

may

lead to

anti-competition effect;

ordering prohibitions on

4)

ordering investiture of an independent undertaking to which the required

id.

acquisitions in the

measure

would

results in

merger.

See

fiiture

assets are transferred. This

sale to a third party

'«'

same market; and

3)

187

is

ordered

when

there

is

lastly,

a danger that any

an anti-competition effect as the

CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES
Historical

Background

Early cases involving mergers were tried under section

Sherman
political

Act,'^*

which were

Government came

efficient

section 7 of the Clayton Act

in

When

it

law

to enact section 7

principal antitrust statute under

amendments

Oil, Steel

and other monopolies. '^"^ However, the

difficulties in dealing

wanted tougher and more

economic and

originally adopted to control the excessive

power concentrated on

Government faced with

and section 2 of the

1

with merger cases with these statutes and

merger cases. '^° From

to regulate

of the Clayton

Act.'^'

Now,

it

has become the

which merger and acquisition cases

was

first

this need, the

are regulated.'^'

The

enacted in 1914, and later strengthened by

1950 (the Celler-Kefauver Act), 1980, and 1984."^

was

originally passed, section 7 only prohibited stock acquisition of a

corporation engaged in

commerce by another corporation

engaged

also

in

commerce

"if

the effect might be substantially to lessen the competition between them, to restrain

'**

15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1994). Section

1

states "[ejverv' contract,

othetAvise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

nations,
to

§

\.

Section 2 states "[e]very person

commerce among

14, at

shall

monopolize, or attempt

monopolize any

the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be

Thomas W. Brunner et al.. Mergers

226

in

the

New

Antitrust Era 3-6

n. 17,

See Id

'"'

15 U.S.C. §18(1994).

'''

For general information, see Brunner et

^'^

who
to

deemed

part of the

guilty of a felony."

§ 2.

"" See

'"^

declared to be illegal." Id

the form of trust or

in

the several States, or with foreign

monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,

trade or

Id

is

combination

commerce among

See id

al.,

supra note

1

89, 3-5.

(

1

985); see also Opi, supra note

34

commerce

any section of the country, or to create monopoly.""'* There was not any

in

mention with regard

to asset acquisition.'^' This

Government because

more aggressively

this lack

was considered inadequate by

the

of jurisdiction was frustrating the merger agents' effort to

attack mergers

which may harm

competition.'^''

There was another

problem, section 7 was apparently covering only horizontal mergers between direct
competitors, not either vertical mergers nor conglomerate mergers.''^ Consequently, the

Congress amended section 7

by expanding

its

in

1950 through the Celler-Kefauver Act'^* and

jurisdictional scope to acquisition of corporate assets

capital or stock, also enabling

it

to cover all three type of mergers.

In addition, section 7 of the Clayton Act, by reading

that

it

"may

fortified

it

and shares of

'^^

be," ^°°makes

it

clear

covers not only actual, realized anti-competitive effect, but also possible or

probable effect from transactions. ^°' Therefore, the merger enforcement Agencies or

private plaintiffs

effect

do not have

on competition. Rather

'"-

15U.S.C.

§

it

prove that a transaction

is

sufficient to

show

at issue will

have an adverse

that there is a slight probability

18(1914).

See Brown Shoe Co.

v.

United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-15 (1962); see also Opi, 5wpra note 14,226

n.l6.
^^ See. e.g., in United States v.

Columbia

Steel Co..

under the Sherman Act, to stop United States Steel

334 U.S. 495 (1948). the Justice Department tried,
acquiring the assets of the Consolidated

Company from

Steel Corporation, but the Supreme Court rejected this Justice Department's effort.
"^ See Brunner et al supra note 1
89, at 3-5.
,

"'

of

^°^

harm on competition.

"'

to

15U.S.C. §§ 18&21.
Brunner et al., supra note

'^ See
'°°

15 U.S.C. §18(1994).

^°'

Opi, supra note 14,

'°'

Id

at

244-45.

1

89, at 5-6.

Id

at

521-23.
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There are also other resources for U.S. merger regulation. Enactment of FlartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act^"^

by which pre-notification

to both Federal

1976 began

in

to provide specific thresholds

Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) and the

Department of Justice may be required. ^°'* Most importantly, there are guidelines issued
by the Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ).^°^ Although these guidelines have no
legal binding

on the

courts, but they strongly suggest the

policy concerning merger cases. ^'^^ Also,

FTC

merger agencies' intention and

issues statement, thereby providing a

secondary guideline.^"^

One

Jurisdictional

Scope

Act

states:

part of Section 7 of the Clayton

No

person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce

shall acquire

capital

,

directly or indirectly, the

and no person subject

shall acquire the

commerce

to the jurisdiction

whole or any

of the Federal Trade Commission

part of the assets of another person

such acquisition

may

commerce

in

any section of the country, the

15U.S.C.

^°^

See Brunner et al supra note

^"^

The guideline explain how

be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a

the

1

89, at 5,6.

DOJ

will define markets, classifV mergers, analyze their competitive

impact, and assess certain defenses. Brunne;retal, supra note 189,

'°'
^°'

13-14.

Mat 3-5.
15U.S.C.

§ 18.

in

of

§ 18a (1976).
,

at

effect

^^*

^°'

^°^Id

engaged also

or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce

or in any activity affecting

monopoly.

whole part of the stock or other share

at 13.
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As explained

when

briefly,

it

was

originally passed in 1914, the jurisdictional range of

section 7 of the Clayton Act covered only stock acquisition between corporations

engaged

commerce.^"' However, by

in

assets acquisition to

its

some

venture, or

^'°

Also

Act was more broadened

any type of entity, and as a

is

amendment

jurisdictional scope.

jurisdictional reach of the

a transaction at issue

its

result, there

made by

was no

in

1

later,

950, the Government added

through

its

1980 amendment the

to include acquisitions virtually

difference

now

under the statute whether

a corporation, a natural person, a partnership, a joint

other type of business entity.^" Also, before

its

1980 amendment, the

Clayton Act reached only transactions "in commerce,"^'^ thereby excluding from
jurisdictional reach transactions

between companies which were not

directly

the production, distribution, or purchase of goods or services in interstate

However, by amending the

statute to insert

extended the jurisdictional scope, making

its

engaged

commerce.

in

"^'^

"any activity affecting commerce,"^ '^ U.S.
reach as far as does the Sherman Act.^'^

it

Consequently, the need for the Sherman Act sections
disappeared.

by

1

and section 2 also almost

^'^

Section 7 also itself contains an exemption from

states that this section 7

would not be applied

its

broad jurisdiction.''^

It

clearly

to persons purchasing stocks "solely for

investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting

^°'

See supra

^•°

Id

text

^" Barbara A.
^'^

15U.S.C.

§

^'^

accompanying notes

Reeves

&

1

88-207.

Linda R. Blumi<in, Acquisitions and Mergers, 890 PLI/Corp 473, 478.

18(1950).

&

at

478-81.

&

at

478-8

See Reeves
Blumkin, 5w/7ra note 213,
-" 15U.S.C. § 18(1980).
^" See Reeves
Blumkin, supra note 2 1 3,
^'"Id

at

478.

'''See id

at

481.

1

37
to bring about, the substantial lessening

inserted to exclude from

control over another

stock acquisition

is

its strict

of competition."^'" This exemption was

enforcement firms with no intention to acquire the

company by purchasing

stock.^'^

However, determining whether the

solely for the purpose of "investment"

on a variety of circumstances

is

not simple. ^^°

The

courts rely

for determining the purpose of stock acquisition, trying to

apply objective standard.^^' For instance, the court look to "borrowing

at

unfavorable

terms to finance large purchases," "speed of acquisition," "presence or absence of
representation on the board of directors."^^^

Many

scholars in the United States, depending on the competitive relationship

which existed between
(2) vertical merger,

parties, classifies

and

(3)

mergers into three types:

(1) horizontal merger,

conglomerate merger.^" Horizontal mergers are

consolidations between direct competitor

who were

manufacturing or distributing same

product or providing same service in the same geographic

area.^^^

Horizontal mergers are

normally deemed most hazardous because of their great potential to directly affect the

market structure by reducing the number of direct competitor."' Vertical mergers are
consolidations between firms at different levels of the

same industry (upstream and

downstream), such as a merger between a manufacturer and one of its distributor or

-" 15U.S.C. §18(1994).
^" See Reeves
Blumkin, supra note 213,

&

^^°
'^'

See Brunner et al, supra note 189,

^" See
^''

at

479-80.

Id.

at

80-82.

id.

Danny Abir, Monopoly arid Merger Regulation
Tax & Bus. Law. 143, 148 (1996).

Int'l
^^^

See Brunner et al., supra note

"' See id

1

89, at

1

6,

1

7.

in

South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis,

1

38
supplier.^^^

Government enforcement

and have been changed from

may

conglomerate mergers

strict

policies toward vertical mergers

enforcement

include

all

to

have been unclear

wide permission. '^^^ Lastly,

type of mergers that are not classified as horizontal

or vertical mergers. In other word, conglomerate mergers are ones other than those

which

can be categorized as horizontal or vertical mergers. ^^^ In a conglomerate merger, the

company

acquiring

is

is

neither potential of actual competitor of the acquired

company, nor

not a supplier of purchaser.^^'

As

explained, the Clayton Act, as originally passed,

merger, but through

its

amendment, now

conglomerate mergers, thus covering

all

its

was covering only

horizontal

coverage includes both vertical and

of the three types of mergers existing.

"°

Defining the Relevant Market

As

in

European Community, the market definition

the United States. """

When

is

also crucially important in

determining whether the effect of the merger

substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,""''' the

first

the

FTC and DOJ,

of all, have to define properly the relevant product and geographic market.'^^ Until

DOJ

"''See
""

"may be

See

and

FTC worked

id.

51-53.

id.

52-53.

""See id

at

'"**

See

"^''

See supra

together to develop a

61-66.

id.

&

*•"

Reeves

-'-

15U.S.C.

'^'

Reeves

&

text

accompanying notes

Blunikin, supra note 213,

1

97-99.
at

481.

at

481-82.

18.

Blumkin. supra note 213,
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more sophisticated approach toward

39
measuring the relevant market and issued their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,"'*

which refined the analysis presented

in the Justice

Department's 1982 and 1984 Merger

Guidelines and the FTC's 1982 Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers,"' there was

no unifying principles as to

how to

define the relevant market, and therefore, most courts

had made inconsistent ruling on the matter of market

definition, relying

on

their

subjective opinion.^'^ Nevertheless, there are several landmark cases with respect to

market definition and these cases have had tremendous influences on
have been providing the

FTC and DOJ

with basis

when both

later cases

and also

agencies issue guidelines.

These are discussed next.
In

Brown Shoe

Co.

v.

United States, ^^^ the Court stated that "[t]he outer

boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of
use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.""*

Since the Court in

submarkets

may

Brown Shoe

stated that "within [a] broad product market, well defined

exist which, in themselves, constitute product

markets for antitrust

purposes,""^ the courts in the U.S. have been considering the possibility of submarkets

whenever they define a relevant
seven "practical

indicia"^"*' for

market.^''°

The Court

in

Brown Shoe

also introduced

determining whether a submarket existed: "industry or

public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar

^'"U.S. Dep't

of Justice

&

Federal Trade

Comm'n,

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552

(Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
"' U.S. Dep't

of Justice

&

Federal Trade

1982); U.S. Dep't of Justice

&

Comm'n, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,493 (June 14,
Comm'n, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June

Federal Trade

1992).

"^ See Brunneretal., supra note 189,

"'370 U.S. 294(1962).

"'M,
-" Id

at

325 (1962).

at

83-87.

14.
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characteristics

and uses, unique production

sensitivity to price changes,

In United States

v.

customers, distinct prices,

facilities, distinct

and specialized vendors.

"^"^

Philadelphia National Bank^'^^ the Court added further

Supreme Court noticed

consideration to market defmition.^''^ In this case, although the

that

some bank

entirely free

services such as checking accounts are "so distinctive that they are

of effective competition from products or services of other financial

institution,"^''^

and the Court determined

that a "cluster"'''^

services constituting "commercial banking"

is

is

the area of effective competition in

which the purchaser can

practically turn for supplies.

definition. Courts in the United States

locations,

how to
have

^''^

The Court noted

which the

"^"^

the 1992 Horizontal

define the relevant market.

legal binding

and

For geographic market

have took into account factors such as "consumer

Merger Guideline provides a
It

that the

"seller operates,

normal pricing patterns, industry recognition, and transportation

Now,

'"^

a relevant product market.^''^ This case

also important with regard to geographic market definition.

geographic market

to

was

of unique and non-unique

"''°

costs.

certain standard about

should be pointed out that the guideline does not

on courts as indicated

in several decisions.

^"'^'

Rather, as stated by

Id.

'''

Id

''-

Id

^'^374 U.S. 321 (1963).
^'^

ABA

"-374

Anti Trust Section, Monograph No.

U.S.

at

12,

Horizontal Mergers:

351-57.

"" Id
'''

Id

"' See Reeves

& Blumkin, supra note 213, at 485-86.

"'374 U.S. at 359.
"°See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213,
'''

Id

at

485-86.

Law and

Policy 35,36 (1986).
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Brunner,^" the Guideline

is

"the prevailing standards of the current Administration and

a fair predictor of the questions future Administrations might ask."^'^ Nonetheless,

some

courts as well as both antitrust agencies have been following the Guideline's approach

the matter of defining a relevant market.^'''

"[mjarket definition

is

Under

on

the Guideline, according to Brunner,

a process of identifying firms

were they

that,

to act as a single

could profitably raise and maintain price (a proxy for the exercise of market

entity,

power)."'''

In order to define a relevant product market under the

agencies,

and DOJ,

will take into account price increase as the

and then consider the other factors as ancillary factors

factor,

effect

FTC

of a price

Merger Guideline, both the

increase.'''^

The Agencies

most important

that indicate the likely

each products produced or sold

will begin with

by each merging firms and ask whether a hypothetical monopolist of those products

would be able

to

impose profitably

at least a

"small but significant and nontransitory

increase"'^" in price for considerable period, with a condition in

products

is

remaining

monopolist pursues
products,

may

'-'

-"

Brunner
Id. at

et al

More

specifically, the agency,

maximum profits

in deciding

ask a hypothetical monopolist

^" See supra note
*"

still.''*

1

,

who

whether

is

which

assuming

sale

of all other

that a hypothetical

of its

to raise the prices

able to impose "small but significant

89

supra note

1

89, at 13.

88.

Id. at 85.

"' 1992 Merger Guidelines, 5w/7ra note 234,
§ 1(11).
'" Id According to the Guidelines, the "small but significant and nontransitory" increase
five percent, but this can be lager or smaller

depending on nature of

70.

"' 1992 Merger Guidelines,

5Mjf7r(3

note 234, § 1(11).

in

industry' at issue. Opi,

price will be

supra note 269-

42
and nontransitory increase"^^'

in price for considerable

time period, without losing

customers to other products or inducing new entry with

facilities easily

its

changeable for

supply substitution.^^" If the reduction in sales of the product, as a response to a price

increase,

would be

profitable to

enough

that a hypothetical

monopolist would not find

impose such a price increase, then the Agency

the product that

the

large

is

next-best substitutable for the merging

same question again

until the

add

to the product

company's product and

Agencies delineate the relevant product market

smallest group of products that will satisfy this

The Agencies,

will

it

group

will ask

to the

test.^^'

in considering the likely reaction

of the buyers to a price increase,

will take into account all relevant factors including the following four factors:

1)

evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases

between products

in

response to relative changes in price or other competitive

variables;

2)

evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer

substitution

between products

in

response to relative changes

in price or

competitive variables;

3)

the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output

markets; and

4)

="

Id.

'""Id
'"'

Id

^" Id

the timing and costs of switching products.

'*'

other

43
This process

is

also

same

for geographic

market definition. ^^^ For each product market

both Agencies determine the geographic market or markets in which the merging firms

produce or

sell.^^"

In order to define a relevant geographic market or markets affected by a

merger, the Agencies will begin with the location of each merging firm and ask whether a

hypothetical monopolist of the relevant product

would be able

to

impose profitably

"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, where the terms of sale

other locations did not change.^^^ This test

is

based on assumption that buyers

purchasing products produced within a location

to

may

shift, in

at

who

are

response to a price increase,

purchasing products produced within other locations.^^* If the reduction in sales of the

product at that location would be large enough so that a hypothetical monopolist

producing or selling the relevant product

profitable to

fi-om

impose such an increase

which production

is

at the

merging firm's location would not find

in price, then the

the next-best substitute for production at the merging firm's

location. This process will continue until a

group of location

hypothetical monopolist over that group of locations

but significant and nontransitory" increase in price.

The 1992 Merger Guideline
and

FTC

will take into account

is listing

when

1

992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234, § (2 ).
see also Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213, at 485-87.

'"'Id

profitably

impose a "small

DOJ

they consider the likely reaction of buyers in

'""Id.

Id.;

identified such that a

four nonexclusive factors which the

^" See Opi, supra note 14, at 261.

^^

would

is

"^^^

response to a price increase as follows:

"^

Agencies will add "the location

1

1

it

44
1

evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases

between different geographic locations

in

response to relative changes

in price

or other competitive variables;

2.

evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer

substitution

between geographic locations

in response to relative

changes in

price or other competitive variables;

3.

the influence of downstream competition faced by buyer in their output

markets; and

4.

the timing and costs of switching supplies.^^^

The 1992 Guidelines do not

which were

explicitly refer to other criteria

listed in the

1984

Guidelines,^^' such as shipment patterns, transportation costs as possible barriers to

shipment into the area, costs of local distribution as possible entry

barriers,

and excess

capacity by companies outside the location of the merging company. ^^° However, this

does not mean the Agencies do not consider these factors any more, rather the
Guidelines states that "the Agency will take into account

relevant evidence.

all

1

992

"^^'

Market Shares And Concentration
For measuring the

level

of concentration, the U.S. antitrust authorities have

developed so-called the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (hereinafter HHI) which was
introduced by the 1984 Guidelines. ^^' The 1992 Guidelines

^"^

1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234,

^*'

U.S. Dep't of Justice

&

Federal Trade

1984).

"° See Opi, supra note
"' Id

"' See

Id. at

277.

1

4, at

27

1

is

continuously using this

§ 1(21).

Comm'n, Merger

Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26.823 (June 14,

45
method.^^'

One of the important

market

characteristics of this test lies in squaring the

share of each participant in the market in order to give greater weight on the market

power of the

larger firms. ^^^ In detail, the

participant and square them, and finally

level. ^^'

Thus,

if

add the

result to

measure the concentration

a market consists of five firms with market shares of respectively 40%,

26%, 17%, 10%, and 7%,
(7 X 7)=2,714.

Agencies determine the market share of

its

HHI

will

Whether the Agencies

be (40 x 40)+(26

will challenge a

x

26)+(17 x 17)+(10 x 10)+

merger or not depends on both

post-merger market share and the increase in concentration resulting from the merger.^^^

According

to the Guidelines, a

market with the post-merger

unlikely to be challenged.^" In other words, those markets will be

HHI

concentrated. If the post-merger

will be

deemed

to

in a

market

is

less than

1

deemed not

,000

to

is

be

between 1,000 and 1,800, the market

be moderately concentrated.'^^ the Agencies are unlikely to challenge a

merger unless an increase

in the

HHI

exceeds

1

00 points because mergers in

this

circumstances are considered not to have adverse competitive consequences.^^' However,

if

HHI of more

a merger produce an increase in the

than 100 points in moderately

concentrated markets, the Agencies will take into account several factors set forth from

section 2 to section 5 of the 1992 Guidelines, such as oligopolies, entry barriers,

efficiencies,

-'-

"failing

company"

defense.'*"

See Id

"* See Reeves
''^
1

&

Blumkin, supra note 2

1

3. at

992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234,

""/J. § 1(51).
''^

Id

'''

Id

"" Id
''°

and the

Id

488.

§ 1(21).
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HHI above

Markets with a post-merger
concentrated.^*'

Mergers producing an increase

1,800 points are

in the

deemed

HHI of less

to

be highly

than 50 points, even in

highly concentrated market, are unlikely to be challenged because they will be considered

not to have adverse competitive consequences in a market.'^*^ If the merger produce

increase in

HHI of only between 50 and

depending on the related

HHI

produce an increase in

overcome

Justification

If the net-impact

justification defending

1

Co.

V.

in excess

will challenge

challenge,

most mergers

that

of 1 00 points, even though related other factors can

For Mergers

of a merger

on

is

pro-competitive, the merger might be given

situations.^*^

Small company doctrine

The Supreme Court once recognized

.

in

Brown Shoe

United States^^^ that two or more companies might be allowed to merge

compete more effectively with
this

The Agencies

may

this presumption.^*''

And

Defense

factors.^*^

100 points, the Agencies

larger,

dominant firms

opinion was rejected in United State

2.

Merger

Failing

company

Guidelines.^**

doctrine

According

.

v.

Von

's

in the relevant market.

Grocery

This justification

to the Guidelines, a

is

in order to

However,

r^^

also contained in the 1992

merger

will be

deemed

to

have

^" Id
'''

Id

'" Id
'''

Id

^^'

These exceptional situation are called defenses because they need

merging

parties. Abir,

supra note 223,

at 151.

'*'

370 U.S. 294.
'''384 U.S. 270(1966)
'*'

£in

1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234,

§ 5(1).

to be raised

and proved by the

little

47
possibility to create or

enhance market power or

facilitate its exercise if the

merger

meet the following conditions:

1)

would be unable

the allegedly failing firm

to

meet

its

financial obligations in

the near future;

2)

it

would not be able

to reorganize successfully

under Chapter

of the

1 1

Bankruptcy Act;

3)

it

has

made

unsuccessful good-faith effort to

elicit

reasonable alternative

offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that

would both keep

its

tangible and in tangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe

danger to competition than does the proposed merger; and

4)

absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant

market.-*^

Procedural Issues

1

.

Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Pre-merger Notification. The United States merger

procedure

is

well provided in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement

Act."''°

importantly, this Act requires that mergers and acquisitions with a certain size

merger notification forms with the

FTC

pre-merger notification requirement

for investigating

'''

mergers which

is

may

and the

DOJ

before

its

a

consummation.^^' This

intended to give a better chance to both agencies

be in violation of the Clayton Act.

"^

Id

-'"

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 [hereinafter HSR], 15 U.S.C.

291

See Ah'n, supra note 223.

">'

See Id

at

file

Most

150-51.

47

§

18a

48

The following

are

two

should be notified prior to

1)

At

least

its

criteria

by which

it

is

decided whether or not a merger

consummation:

one of the parties

to the

merger must do business

in

of affect interstate

or foreign commerce.^''''

2a)

The

size

of the merging parties must meet one of the three conditions:

the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal

$100 million or more and the

acquired party engaged in manufacturing has assets or annual sales equal to

$10 million of more; or
2b) the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal $100 million or more and the

acquired party not engaged in manufacturing has assets equal to 10 million or

more; or
2c) the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal $10 million or

more and

the

acquired party have assets or annual sales equal to $100 million or more. This

test

can be satisfied without the

total acquisition

of the assets of the acquired

party.^'''

After the transaction

total

is

amount of securities and

complete, either the acquiring party will hold an aggregate

assets of the acquired party totaling

value, or the acquiring party will hold 15

acquired party.

consummate

='-

-"

'^'^'^

If the parties to a

$15 million or more

% or more of the voting securities of the

in

merger which

is

subject to a pre-merger notification

the merger without filing the notification forms with both agencies

15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(l)(1994).

15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C)(1994).

48

(DOJ

49
and FTC), they

may be

subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day, for each day

the violation continues.^'^

The

merger which

parties to a

is

subject to the pre-merger notification cannot

complete the merger for a certain period of time. This
If the

days.'^''^

HSR

is

normally 30

reviewing agency ,however, believe that the merger raises doubt as to

compatibility with the Clayton Act, the agency

may

a second request from the reviewing agency,

days from the time that

all

waiting period. ^^^ If there

initial

demanding

the parties involved to provide

on the transaction, the waiting period

additional information

its

issue a formal "request for additional

information" or "second request" prior to the end of the

is

waiting period

is

extended for additional 20

the parties required to be in compliance with the second

request are actually in compliance with the request.'^'^ If the agencies decide to stop the

merger, they must do so within this additional twenty

the initial waiting period

is

15 days, and this period

is

days.'^""

For the cash tender

offer,

subject to extension of additional

10 days from the time of actual compliance.^*''

At the end of the waiting

period, if one of the Antitrust agencies decide to

challenge the merger or acquisition, the reviewing agency seeks a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction in federal district court. ^°"

concern

'"'

may be allowed

to

proceed

if the parties enter into

Some

transactions with minor

consent decrees with the

15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3)(A)-(C)(1994).

^'MSU.S.C. §18a(gKl)
""^

According

to take

to Abir,

supra note 223,

at 151,

even though the waiting period

immediate action against a merger subject

to

is

generally 30 days, failure

pre-merger notification does not prevent the agencies

form subsequently challenging the merger as a violation of section 7of the Clayton Act.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
'''

Id.

"^Id.
'"'

See Reeves

&

Blumkin, supra note

1

89, at 50

1

49

50
agency. ^"^ If the Agencies do not ask the district judge to issue a preliminary injunction

or if the request

consummate

is

dismissed, then the parties to the merger at issue are free to

the merger.^"'* Nevertheless, an action

may be

brought before an

administrative law judge or before a district court, depending on which agency

with the

is

dealing

case.^°^

Consent Decree
Negotiation resolution in the U.S. merger control system
decrees. ^^^

as an order of the federal court.^°^

EU merger settlement,

assets in order to reduce their

attain

power

'°'

'^

at

in a particular field

of market. ^°^ Also, United States

markets as independent competitors.

^°^

501-502..

Id.
Id.

^°'
1

5 U.S.C.

1

8a(0If the FTC

administrative law judge, and

Reeves
'°''

United States often require companies to divest

an assurance from acquiring companies that they will continue to do

their business in their relevant

^°-W.

and also quasi-

compromises negotiated between the Department of Justice and the

is later ratified

Similar to

sometimes

made through consent

A consent decree has a characteristic of quasi-contractual

judicial because the

companies

is

&

dealing with the case, the jurisdiction over the case belongs to an

is

if

the

Blumkin, supra note 2

1

Freret, supra note 7, at 168-70.

"' Id
'"'

Id

'°'

Id

DOJ

3, at

is

50

1

dealing with the case, the jurisdiction belongs to a district court.

51

Remedies
There are basically seven actions

These

are: (1) injunction against

(4) partial divestiture, (5)

restrictions

1)

on future

merger,

it

consummation,

mandating aid

acquisitions. ""'

injunction against

that the

(2)

abandonment,

to competitors, (6)

Each

is

consummation

prohibits

government can order undertakings.

^'°

(3) total divestiture,

conduct restrictions, and (7)

discussed below:

is

issued before the closing date of the

consummation of the

entire transaction

and thus, causing a

"fiill-stop" injunction;^''

2)

abandonment of the merger usually takes place when there
announcement of intent

3)

total divestiture is the

merger has closed.
rarely ordered

common remedy

by the courts due

its

to its punitive effects,

former owners; (b) spinoff

made an independent company with

of the acquirer and management

most

divestiture are

by

sale

is

5)

remedies have included mandating aid

'''See Id
'''

Id.

See id

involved the acquired

—the acquired business

stock distributed to the shareholders

achieved by selling off a subsidiary or

partial divestiture is

,

1

it is

of assets to a third party;

4)

See generally, Brunner et al supra note

'''See

its

it

—although

if the

separated; and (c) sale to a third party

create or strengthen competitor of the

'"

ordered by the government

takes one of three forms: (a) rescission

business being resold to

is

a government

to sue;""^

most

(It

is

89, at

1

division;^'''

to competitors ordering provisions to

merged

89-203.

firm.

It

may

involve ordering

52
the buyer to help a rival

lists,

6)

and related

firm forms, customer

supplies;^'^

conduct restrictions
restricts the

company by providing new

in lieu

of divestiture

is

also favored by the government.

conduct of would-be parties by prohibiting

It

common management,

limiting exchange of information, and placing rules about sales to each

other;"'

7)

when

the

government deems

that

it

cannot win divestiture,

it

settles for

order restricting future acquisitions. (One of the three measures

blanket prohibition

is

rarely used presently

a

ordered: (a)

ban on acquisition for a period of years.

flat

due

is

to

its

unduly

restrictive effects; (b)

required to get a prior approval from the government.

an

It is

companies are

The government

usually puts a ten-year restraint on fiiture acquisitions; and (c) sometimes the

government requires a notice of a future transactions

Penalties

expected.'"''

impose a

.A.ct.

Id.

'''See

Id.

DOJ

initiates

strictly

may

Brunneretal, supra note

'''See Id

See Id

it

may

be fined up to $

may

not reported under

1

is

institute a criminal action to

imprisonment for violation of the monopoly laws or

Corporations

is

enforced and compliance to orders

an action,

if there is

million for violation of the

a per se

Sherman

be fined up to $100,000 and/or imprisonment for up to

15 U.S.C. § 18a.

'" 5ee

''°

the

Likewise, individuals

'''See
j;7
''

These remedies are

When

fine or

violation.^'"

.

that

189. at 189-203..
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three years."' In addition, violations of the

FTC's order

are punishable by fines

up

to

$10,000 per offense, or per day for each day of the continuing offense, and, even resulting

in

imprisonment."^

"'

See

Id.

'"-

See

Id.

CHAPTER IV

SOUTH KOREA
Background Of Implementing The Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act

The anti-merger provision of South Korea
and Fair Trade
Trade Act

is

Act.^^' Especially, the

Chapter

3

is

found

in the

Monopoly Regulation

of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair

providing whole provisions for the merger regulation in the Act.

As

a series

of mergers by conglomerates in Korea have been causing a significant economic
concentration in the Korea market, the "Merger Regulation and Fair Trade Act'* in 1981

the

Korean Antitrust Act, was enacted against the economic

MRFT Act will

Section, a brief history of implementing the

addition, a brief report about

Historical

in

Korea

be introduced, and in

will be provided.

Overview

From
Korea

merger practice

concentration.^"'* In this

the

1

970s,

new

social

and economic problem began

to

appear

in

South

as anti-competitive behaviors of business entities, such as aggravation of

monopolization and generalization of various type of trust and unfair trade practice, was
being spread and accepted in

common

sense

among people

as well as business bodies.

^^^

The official title of this Act is "Dok-Jum-Kyu-Je Mit Kong-Jeong-Keo-Rae- Eh Kwan-Han Boep-Ryul"
[Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], promulgated by Law No. 3320 (Dec. 31, 1980), codified as
amended by Law No.4831 (Dec. 23, 1994). [hereinafter MRFT Act].
^^ See Seung Wha Chang, A Probabilistic Approach to Multi-market Mergers: Proposed Merger Policy
against Economic C concentration Under the Korean Antitrust Act and Section
of the U.S. Clayton Act.
^-'

"^

32

COLUM.

'''

See Id

J.

Transnafl L. 43, 43-44 (1994).
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This chaotic economic situation forced the Korean Government to enact the
with the purpose of (1) stimulating
(2) protecting customers,

and

(3)

fair

competition

among

MRFT Act

business groups,

accomplishing well-balanced national economic

growth. ""^^ Until the seventies, the Government had tried to maximize economic scale by
supporting the largest groups politically and

financially.''"^

However, while the

largest

groups were enlarging their business scales with monopoly power, middle-sized and
small-sized firms were being seriously threatened to be expelled from the market."^

was becoming more and more concentrated, and

Also, the market

anti-competitive practices including monopolization and unfair trust

rapidly each year, along with increment of unfair trade behaviors.

dynamic circumstances, the Korean Government came

hope of correcting unfair business practice and stimulating

fair

number of

was increasing

^"'^

to enact the

the

Under these

MRFT Act in the

competition in the

market.""

The

Article 7 of the

MRFT Act.

especially,

is

the anti-merger provision very

similar to the Section 7 of the Clayton Act of the United States."' In fact, the Article 7 of

the

MRFT Act was modeled after the amended

result, the

key languages

like the Section 7

See id

'''

See id

'-"

See id

both anti-merger statutes are quite similar.^^^ For instance,

of the Clayton Act. the Section 7 of the

prohibit an>' mergers of

'-"

in

which the

'-"

See id
"" See id
'""
^"'-

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and as a

15 U.S.C. §18(1988)
Chang, supra note 324,

at

43-44.

MRFT Act

is

supposed

to

effect ''may substantially lessen competition in the

56
particular field of trade."''" Therefore, the

Act,

is

Korean

MRFT Act also,

authorizing the right to interfere even where there

is

like the

Clayton

only possibility of anti-

competitive effect without any actual negative effect on the market."'*

One of the
introducing

legislature.

outstanding point about the

MRFT Act was proposed
At

that time,

in

1

MRFT Act is the fact that the bill

980 by the executive branch rather than the

Korea was experiencing the

transition

from Fourth

to Fifth

Republics, and the Korea Assembly (Congress) was in temporary suspension. The

"National Security Legislation Conference"' was elected as an interim authority of the

Korea Assembly. During replacement period,
Conference passed several

Merger Practices

in

bills,

and

this

MRFT Act

is

National Security Legislation

one of them.

"^

South Korea

Even though. South Korea has

essentially similar

merger regulation as

that

of the

United States, the application of the regulations have shown quite different aspect owing
to the differences in their

own

respective economic circumstances and government

policies."^ This section will provide a brief picture of

merger practice

in

South Korea

until 1990."'

Informally, the Korean

large

economy

Chaebol

is

economy

sector controlled by a

officially called

"^

MRFT Act, supra note

"*

Chang, supra note 324,

323.

is

sometimes called chaebol economy due

to the

few number of conglomerates called "chaebol.'"

"Ki-Up-Jip-Dhan", and both words represent "business

art. 7(1).

at 44.

'" Byung-bae Kim, Easy Fair Tr.ade (Al-Ki-Shi-Un Kong-Jung-Ge-Rac) 44.45 (1996).
"* See Abir, supra note 223, at 158-59.
"' See Id.
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conglomerates."''"'^

These

companies which are
companies,

in

most

select

conglomerates are composed of several specialized

interrelated closely with each other.

Although the subordinate
of law, they form

cases, appear to operate independently as a matter

interdependence by supporting and servicing each other financially and technically."'
In South Korea, the

the chaebols'

economic concentration

is

closely connected to the growth of

economic power.^^" The Korea economy history reveals

that the

conglomerates, while trying to accomplish diversification, aggravated the economic
concentration in the market.^^' Until the 1970s, most corporations tried to enlarge their

business sizes by focusing on internal growth, and as a result, almost

all

markets began to

be dominated by these minority number of enlarged corporations.

However,

after the 1970s, the situation

changed dramatically.

It

was no longer

possible to enlarge the business scale by just relying on internal growth because

markets were already occupied by a few corporations with a dominant
Corporations were not

left

any choice but

to

merge with other

all

position.'''*'

corporation.^"*^

With

this

change, the corporations with dominant position began to trying to expand their business

lines

by merging and acquiring other corporations, and thus, became huge economic

"* See Chang, supra note 324, at 48.
"' Most criticism concerning chaebol

economy

is

about their executive bodies. Originally, most of the

chaebol evolved from a family business and they are

members of the one who

still

remaining under the control of the family

created the business. In other world, these family

members

are

occupying the core

executive position and possessing a strong power to have decisive influence on business decisions. Jd
'"'

Id

'"

Id

"= Id
"' Id

at

48-57.

58
entities

with several number of affiliates. The

background has seriously contributed
There were 2,003 mergers reported

KFTC) between
the

Korean

1

98 1 and

government.'*''^

1

to

generation of chaebols created in this

economic concentration

in Korea.^'*''

Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter

to the

990, but

new

among

these, only

two mergers were challenged by

Furthermore, even these two cases were settled

down

without

being brought to the merging firms, as they accepted the administrative order as a matter

of negotiation.^'*'' To make

it

worse, large portion of mergers accomplished by large-scale

business entities were executed for the sole purpose of establishing diversification rather

than structure rationalization or to strengthen competition.^''^ Furthermore, most of the

target firms

were companies not belonging

cases, only small independent businesses

During

all this

time, the

to

any other chaebol, as a

were

''^^

Korea government,

in the effort

to the lack

necessary' to closely

"^

of establishing large size
in the foreign

market, had

mergers.'*'''^

Jurisdictional

Due

most

sacrificed.

of economic scale and strengthen international competitiveness
a policy jQot to challenge

result, in

Scope

of any legislative record of decisions by the Korea court,

examine the

it

statute itself, in this case, to figure out the legislative

Id.

"- Id. at 55-56.

"'

Two

'"^

Dong-Yang Chemical, 82- January 13.1 982, 982 MRFT Act Decision) and
December 15, 1982, 1982 MRFT Act Decision),
mergers accomplished between 1981 and 1990, more than 32% of the mergers were

cases are:

Song-won

Among

(

1

)

1

1

.

(2)

lndustr\. 82-24,
the

accomplished for the sole purpose of diversification, 17.1°o for the purpose of rationalization of financial
structures and rationalization of production and marketing, and 8.2°

supra note,
'''

Id

at 57.

o

for acquiring failing firms.

Chang,

is
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intention.

first

is,

type

The
is

Article 7 of the

a combination

any corporation

that

enforcement decree

is

MRFT Act

prohibits

which may resuU

two types of combination."" The

in restricting

in the

meets the paid-in capital or whole asset threshold

prohibited from engaging in any activity

substantial restriction of competition in ''particular field

same

competition

when

set in the

there

of trade.""' The

market That

is

likely to a

statute, in the

Article, is listing those prohibited activities as follows:

1)

acquiring or owning shares of another corporation;

2)

allowing an office or an employee to concurrently hold a position as an office

of another corporation;

3)

merging with another corporation;

4)

taking over or leasing the whole or a substantial part of the business or

undertaking the management of another corporation, or taking over the whole

or substantial part o the fixed assets used for the business of another

corporation; and

5)

participating in the establishment of a

The second type
unfair method.

strictly

MRFT

'^'

Id

'''

Id

353

Id

art.

Act. supra note 323. art 7.

7(3).

that, regardless the size

forbidden by the Act."^

Id.

^"°

corporation."'

combinations which are accomplished through compulsion or

The Act provide

combinations are

»"

is

new

of the corporate,

this

kind of

J
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Thus, the statute

expressly showing that the regulation will be applied to

is

mergers with a certain size as
president decree for the

in the

European Community."^ The Article

MRFT Act, as amended

1

1

in Feb. 1993, require that the

of the

merger

regulations only apply to corporations with paid-in capital of more than 5 billion

won

or

with whole assets of 20 billion won.^"

The words

"particular field of trade""*

relevant market

which

section of the country

is

is

similar to the United States' definition of a

"in any line of commerce or in any activity

,"''"

commerce

in

any

and has a meaning of a relevant market including both the

relevant product and geographic market."^

Defense and Justifications for Combinations

Mergers and acquisitions have been playing important roles

in the

Korea economy

history and have been catalysts in accomplishing a considerably large scale of the

economy."' As a

result, the

challenge mergers

market.

'*^*'

when

This tendency

and medium-sized firms.

''''

See supra

text

'" the official

Ryong

is

'""Id.

Id

157.

apparent

when

the mergers only involve small-

55.

of this enforcement decree

MRFT Act

Decree] (Sept.
art. 7.

Abir, supra note 223, at 155-56.

"'Mat
'''

much more

^*'

MRFT Act, supra note 323,
^" 15U.S.C. § 18(1994).
^^*

to intensely

the effects of mergers are especially not highly dangerous to the

accompanying notes

title

[hereinafter

"*

Korean government has the tendency not

is

"Ki-Up-Kyol-Hap-Eh Kwan-Han Beop-Yul-Si-Hang-

2, 1981).
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According

to the

certain combinations

MRFT Act,

when

the

Commission

is

allowed

to give

permission to

they have the purpose of achieving industrial rationalization

MRFT Act Decree.

or strengthening international competitiveness specified in the

""^'^

The

burden of proving the need to rationalize the industry or strengthen international
competitiveness

lies

on the enterprises seeking the combination

in question.''"

Compatibility Test

For a compatibility

factors.

^^^

However,

as in the United States, this test

depending on whether the merger

example

in case

MRFT Act art.

According

KFTC

may

be

will take into account several

somehow

different,

horizontal, vertical or conglomerate because, for

is

of a horizontal merger, there will a explicit anti-competition effect due to

the reduced competitor in the

^^"

of a merger, the

test

7(

1

).

MRFT Act

to the article, business

same

Decree

market."*^^

is

providing detail conditions for

this

kind of defense.

combinations for "industry' rationalization" shall be permitted only when

the conditions set forth in any one of the following subparagraphs are met:

1

when

restructuring the industrial organization

activities
2.

where investment
is

3.

is

critical for

enhancing the efficiency of industrial

and the rationalization of management;
in facilities

and operations requires substantial funds, and procurement of such funds

impossible through normal means; or

where a business combination
art.

is

necessary for the public interest.

MRFT Act

Decree, supra note 355,

13.

Article 14 set forth conditions for the justification of "strengthening international competitiveness":

1.

where international competitiveness can be significantly improved

means of accelerating technological development,
like;
2.

terms of price and quality by

management, and the

or

where a

substantial contribution can be

activities in overseas markets,
'"'

MRFT Act,

'"^

See Abir, supra note 223,

'"

in

attaining optional scales for

supra note 323,

See KiM, supra note 335,

at
at

art.
1

made

to the increase

of exports by accelerating business

such as collecting information, marketing, and sales.
7(2).

57-78.

280-28

1

Id. art 14.
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Korean Merger Regulation

In general, the

actual

dominant position but also where there

position.^^^

is

is

applied not only where there

is

a

a possibility of creating a dominant

MRFT Act provides that any combination should be considered to be

The

substantially restraining competition in a particular market if the combination

fall

into

one of the following categories:

1

The

total

criteria

market share of the parties

to the business

of a market-dominant enterprise and

market, and also the difference between the

is

combination meets the

the highest in the particular

total

market share and the market

share of the corporation with the second highest market share

25%
2)

At

more than

of the sum of the market share.

least

listed

one of the parties

to the

merger

is

one of the large-scale corporations

by the Commission and the business combination

a market in

more than
than

is

at issue

takes place in

which the market share of the small-and-medium enterprises

two-thirds.

5% of the

And

also, the parties to the

combination acquire more

market share as a result of the business combination.

For the horizontal merger compatibility

test,

the

KFTC

^^^

will take into account

following factors:

a)

market share and market concentration before and

b)

existence of new technology or

ability to

change the market

'""Id.

'"

MRFT Act, supra note

323,

art 7(4).

new

after the

merger;

product which might have potential

structure;

is
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c)

the financial condition of the concerned parties;

d)

threatening from abroad (import and export situation, custom, etc.);

e)

market entry barrier

f)

substitutabiHty of the concerned product.

The Korean Merger Guidehnes
1)

First, there

to a

new

participant;

and
"'^^

also provides a 3-step test:

must be newly formed command-acceptance relationship between

the merging parties after the merger.

2)

Second, those merging parties must be in a competitive relationship or

in a

supplier-consumer relationship for the resource material.

3)

Third, there must be a dominant position formed due to the

command-acceptance

In any case, the

first

relationship.

analysis."*™

in

However,

Korea, too

many

if the

post-merger

HHI

is

over 1,800."'

More

^**

These Factors are also important factors

and business

"° See

Id.

"' See

id.

at

often used for the market concentration

in the

United States

281-83.

is

applied to mergers

electric washer, auto, gas,

market

sophisticated study on this matter

entities in respect

conglomerate mergers. Abir, supra note 223.
Kim, supra note 335.

comparing the market share

will be belonging to a highly concentrated

KFTC

'"'

is

of products such as milk,

both

Id.

is

same measure used

different types

and telecommunication

^^^

step for the compatibility test

and market concentration. The HHI Index

newly formed

to

in

is

which the
required for

of predictability.

be taken into consideration

at 157.

in

case of vertical and
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Procedural Aspects

Filirm of Report

The

MRFT Act requires corporations which meet the conditions set forth in its

Article 12 to notify the

the

Commission

KFTC

of mergers and acquisition transactions, thereby allowing

the opportunity to

examine combinations which may have

competitive impact on a particular market/^^ The reporting requirement

to corporations

whose

total

amount of assets or revenues (meaning

amount of assets of revenues of affiliates) meet

the

is

anti-

only applied

sum of the

total

the criteria set forth in the enforcement

Decree, and the Article 18 of the enforcement Decree provides the total assets or sales

revenue exceeding

1

00

billion won.^^^

For corporations with such a dimension as described above, the combination must
notify the

a)

Commission:

when

the acquiring corporation

owns more than twenty percent

15 percent for listed corporations by the

Commission) of the

(or

total

more than

number of

shares issued by the acquired corporation;

b)

when an

officer or an

employee of a corporation concurrently holds the

position of officer of another corporation;

c)

a corporation intends to merge with another corporation, takes over another

corporation, or establish a

"-

MRFT Act, supra note

'''Id. art. 12(1).

323,

atl. 12.

new

corporation; or

65

when

d)

new

The

a corporation subscribes to twenty percent pr

corporation to be established.

more of the shares of a

374

MRFT Act applies different reporting period for the combinations by large

market-dominant corporations."' In general, a reporting for business combination

size or

must be

filed within

30 days

after the date

of execution of a business combination.

However, provided the case involves mergers, takeovers, or the establishment of new
firms,

and

if one or

more corporations

in the

combination

is

a large corporation or a

market-dominant Enterprise, the combination must be reported within 30 days

after the

date of execution of a merger agreement of a business transfer agreement or the date of

adoption of a resolution

a shareholders meeting concerning participation in the

at

establishment of a corporation."^

Once an

enterprise has filed a report to the

KFTC,

it

cannot register a merger,

perform the obligations under the business transfer agreement, or subscribe
within 30 days. The Commission may,

if

it

deems

it

to shares

necessary, shorten this period or

extend up to 60 days."^

The

KFTC

can request from merger parties any documents necessary for

investigations."** If the parties to a

""M

art.

enterprises,

and also according

Id. art. 4.
Id. art.

12(4).

"'/c/. art. 12(5).

"* Id

art.

to file a report to

KFTC

fail to

12(1).

" MRFT ACT requires that the

^'^

combination required

its

4(2).

Fair Trade

Commission, once

to Article 14 the

commission

is

a year, designate

market-dominant

required to designate large business groups.

66

do

this or

Also,

if a

provide a false report,

it

punishable by a fine up to 100 million won/^'^

is

corporation has been established or companies have been merged in violation of

Article 7 or without filing report or observing the waiting period, the

file

a lawsuit to nullify the business combination at issue.

Commission may

^^°

Other than large-scale enterprises or market-dominant enterprises, corporations

wishing to establish business combinations

merger examination as

to

may

petition the

Commission

for a pre-

whether the business combination has the effect of substantially

restraining competition, and the

Commission,

after receiving a request for a

pre-merger

examination, shall notify the petitioner of the result within 30 days. The Commission

may

extend this period up to 60 days

if

deems

it

it

necessary.^*'

Remedies
For the companies which have violated or are likely to violate the merger
regulations, the

step the

first

those companies.

''^'

The

KFTC may

KFTC may

opt to take

is

issuing corrective measures against

order "prohibition of such act in violation,"

"disposition of an officer," "resignation of an officer," "transfer of business,"

"cancellation of debt guarantees," "public

announcement of the

corrective measures necessary to correct the violation of law.

Any

party

Commission can

who
file

is

dissatisfied with

violation," or "other

"^^^

any measures taken by the Fair Trade

an appeal with the Fair Trade Commission within 30 days from

'"Id. an. 68(2)

^Ud

art.

16(2)

*'

Id

art.

12(6)

*'

Id

art.

16(1)

*'

Id

art.

16(1)

The

Fair Trade

Commission must provide

the opportunity to state their opinions.

Id. art.

52.

opportunity' the parties or interested parties with

67
receiving the measures at issue.

"'^'^

The

Fair Trade

Commission has 30 days

reaches a decision concerning the appeal, but the period

is

until

it

extendible up to 30 days under

unavoidable circumstances.^^'
If any party

which

filed

an appeal with the

respect to the measures taken by the Commission,

receiving the judgment on the

its

KFTC
it

will

still

wants

to file a lawsuit

with

do so within 30 days from

appeal. ^*^ In this case, the

whole jurisdiction exclusively

belongs to the Seoul High Court.^^^

If a

combination already has been accomplished in violation of article 7 or

without filing a report, the

KFTC may

file

a lawsuit to nullify the combination. ''^^ In other

words, unlawful combinations of companies are not deemed to be null and void until
there

a final and conclusive court decisions nullifying those combinations.

is

Penalties

regulation

person

may

who

imposed

.

There

is

also penal provisions in the

result in a fine

violated

it.^^''

up

to

According

concurrently.^*^' Also, the

violation of the regulations.^^'

MRFT Act.^*^ The violation of the

two million won and three years

in jail for

to Article 66, the prison sentence

KFTC may

impose surcharge

The amount of surcharge

will vary

for

and

fine

companies

any

may be
in

depending on the

provision violated, the type of the combination and the amount of transaction.^^'

"'/J.

art.

53(1).

'''

Id

art.

53(2).

'''

Id

art.

54.

"'/a', art. 55.

"VJ.

art.

16(2).

'" Article 66 through 71
'^Z^.

art.

66(1).

"'

art.

66(2).

Id

'"'Id an. 17.
'''

Id

is

dealing with penal sanctions.

Id. arts.

66-71.

CHAPTER V
JAPAN
Background: The Antimonopoly Act of Japan
Chapter 4 of the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter

regulation.^^"

The following content

implementing of the

in this section

AMA)

of the

is

devoted to the merger

article is

background of

AMA Act.

Before the Second World War, there was not any anti-monopoly law

Even

the term "fair competition"

world.^^^

was not receiving any

attention

from the business

Economic development was achieved under government's strong

and guidance, the concern of the Japanese government did not
balanced development of industries.

At

this time, the

lie

in Japan.

on

fair

interference

competition nor

"^"^^

Japanese economy was suffering from economic concentration

by many large industrial combines called "zaibatsu."^^^ They were large industrial
conglomerate composed of many companies engaged

in various industries controlled

head company and linked through mutual stock holding and interlocking
the

"^

economic problem caused by

The

official title

of the Act

is

"zaibatsu'". the

'"'

See id

its

"Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of

"' See MiTSUo Matsushita. International Trade Competition

See id

directories.^''*

Japanese government changed

Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of 14 April 1947).

'"'

by a

"^ See id

68

Law

in

Japan 76 (1993).

As
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attitude drastically

deconcentration.

The

and established

The

original

Act was modeled

its

goal on the economic democratization and

AMA was the first tool for this new government policy.

AMA was enacted in

AML

1947. Generally speaking, the original

United States Antitrust law. the original

after

^^'

AMA imposed stringent

controls over mergers and acquisitions, strictly prohibited cartels

among

firms in

competitive relationship, prohibited undue imbalance in business power, and allowed
severely narrow exemptions. ''^^ Thus, the

main concern of the

control rather than prohibiting specific conduct of the

In 1953, the Japanese

amendment of the Act
beneficial to the

Government relaxed

after realizing that too

economy

after the war."""^

AML Act was a structural

enterprises.'*'^'

AMA enforcement through

much

stringent enforcement

is

not any

The amendment relaxed and changed

the per

se prohibition against cartels to a prohibition against substantial cartels, relaxed the

provisions regulating mergers and acquisitions, and abolished the prohibited prohibition

of undue imbalance

The

in

economic

power.''°^

AMA was once again amended in

significant because

it

was

amendment introduced

the first

''control

1977.

amendment which strengthened

whereby

could apply prohibition to a price cartel agreement.

See

Id. at

76-78.

'"^

See

Id. at

78-79.

'''

See Id

""'

Id

'''

Id

''''

Id

at

79-81.

at

82-84.

its

is

enforcement. The

of monopolistic situation" to the Act for "structure

control," also introduced price reporting system

''^

The amendment of 1977

'*°^

the Fair Trade

Commission

The

current

70

AMA regulates a broad range of business activities. The Act

prohibits cartels with certain exceptions and private monopolization and unreasonable

restraints

on

directories,

trade.

The Act

and merger and acquisitions which may substantially

in a market. Also, the

trade,

power

practices.

in restraint

of

''°'

AMA also created the Fair Trade Commission which

agency of the

restrain fair competition

Act prohibits international agreement or contract

and prohibits unfair business

The

holding companies, stockholdings, interlocking

restricts

is

the enforcement

AMA provisions. The Fair Trade Commission is given a wide scope of

to investigate, hold hearing,

and decide whether the act

in question violates the

AMA.'*"^ The Fair Trade Commission can issue an administrative order

party in violation of the

violation of the

commanding

a

AMA to cease or make some correction to the conduct in

Act."*"^

Jurisdictional

Provisions in Chapter 4 of the

Scope

AMA are providing measures which

specifically designed to prevent concentration of economic

enterprises.''^^ Articles 9, 9(2)

and

1 1

power by few

are provisions for the control

is,

in general,

large

of a general

concentration of economic power, and the other articles in the same chapter have

provisions for the control of a specific concentration of economic power.""' For example,

'°'

Id

at

86-89.

^°'

Id

at

98-1 10.

'°'

Id

'°'

See Abir, supra note 290,

at

168-69.

'*°^

The title of Article 9 is "prohibition of holding compan\ ," the one of .Article 9.2
amount of stockholding by a giant non-financial company," and the title of Article
stockholding rate by a financial company." AMA, supra note 394, arts. 9-1 i.

is
1

1

"restriction
is

on

"restriction

total

on
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Article 10

is

dealing with stock acquisition. Article 13 prohibits the interlocking

directories, Article 14 prohibits an acquisition

if this

of stocks by a person other than a company

tends to substantially restrain competition in a market, and Article 15

devoted to

is

mergers.

Prohibition of Holding

Article 9 of the

Article 9(2), a

Companies

AM A prohibits any holding companies which

company whose major business

control them/'"

Under

the Article 9,

it

is

to hold stocks

is,

according to

of other companies and to

does not matter whether the holding company

in

question causes an anti-competitive impact in a particular filed of market or not/" In

other words, this provision

company/'^
this

On the

applicable as long as a

is

contrary, as far as a

company

company continue

exist as a

form of holding

to carry out its

company does come under the range of Article 9 even when

the

own

company

business,

controls

company by means of stockholding/'^

another

The reason

for this strict prohibition can be traced

back

to legislative history.

Before the enactment of AMA, Japanese economy was suffering from economy

domination by the "zeibatsu" combinations

of various companies which belonged
of the

body thought

that they

See Matsushita, supra note 395,

*'''SeeId.
''-

Id.

*''

Id

'''

Id

which a holding company controlled stocks

same

group.''"'

AMA was strict prohibition of resurrection of

legislative

*^°

to the

in

at

can achieve

124-25 (1993).

One of the

legislative

purpose

the "zeibatsu" combinations and the

this goal

by controlling formation of
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holding companies

at

an early stage/'' Therefore, the Article 9(2)(1

)

is

regarded as a

preliminary preventive measure. However, there have been criticism about this provision

because the Article 9 prohibits any holding companies even

when

they do not create any

anti-competitive effect in a market.'"^

Quantitative Limitation of Stock-Holding

Article 9(2)(1) prohibits any large

financial services

whichever

capital is larger than 10 billion

1 1

provides a

is

greater/'^ Here, a large

maximum

institutions are prohibited

total

company

is

yen or whose net assets are larger than 30
limit

exception from application of Article

of 5% of the

in business other than

from holding stocks of another company above the value of its

capital, or its net worth,

Article

company engaged

own

one whose
billion yen/'*

of stockholding for financial institutions which are
9(2)/''^

According

to the Article, these financial

from acquiring or holding stock of another company

outstanding stock of unless there

is

in

excess

a permission from the Fair Trade

Commission of Japan/^''
Acquisition and Holding of Stocks

Under

Article 10(1), the acquisition of stocks

by one company of another company, competition
restrain, or if the acquisition

of stocks

is

in a

unlawful

market

if,

may

as the result of stocks

be substantially

is

accomplished through unfair trade pratices/"'

in

banking,

Ud.
'Id.
^

AMA,

5Mpra note 394, Art 9.2(1).

'Id
''

'-"

Financial
/J. art

1

Companies

refer to

one engaged

trust,

insurance, business securities. Id

1

""'

Id. art.
0( ). This Article is dealing with a situation in which a company acquires stocks of another
company, thereby controlling the other company, but each company remains a separate company. Id
1

1
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Acquisition and Holdinu of Stocks

Under

Article 10(1), the acquisition of stocks

by one company of another company, competition
restrain, or if the acquisition

As

to the issue

of stocks

of how

much

is

is

in a

unlawful

market

if.

may

as the result of stocks

be substantially

accomplished through unfair trade pratices/^'

company

stock holding by a acquiring

is

necessary to

be deemed to have control over the acquired company, the Fair Trade Commission,

in

1981, issued guidelines called ''Standards for Examination of Stockholding by

Companies. '"*'' According

to the guidelines,

of another company reach more than
acquired

company amounts

outstanding stocks are

acquiring

50%

to a "related

owned by another

it

is

deemed

that there is control

(4) if the acquiring

company" which

is

a corporate entity

20%

corporate entity by

company and

rankiing shareholder, or the acquiring

the acquired

company and

or more; (3) the

but less than 25

company

the acquired

is

Article 10 uses the

regulation

*'

Id. art.

is

10(1

words "may be"

authorizing the Fair Trade

).

This Article

is

company, thereby controlling
^^^

See Matshishita, supra note 395,

*^'

Id. at 127.

'-'

AMA.

jsupra note 394,

art.

Commission

10(1).

at

to

first-

in

a

company

in the

competitive relationship.""

in the provision."''"'

This means that the

be able to block a merger

in its

in which a compan\ acquires stocks of another
compan\. but each compan\ remains a separate company. Id.

dealing with a situation

the other

in a

the

% of the

companies are

competitive relationshiop; or (5) companies jointly hold stocks of another

form of a joint venture and the holding companies are

whose

stocks of the acquired

company holds more than 10%

outstanding stocks of the acquired

(1) stocks

of a company's otstanding stocks; (2) the

company holds more than 25% of the outstnading

company;

if:

126.
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tends to be substantially restrained or

if the

merger

is

carried out through an unfair

business practice/^^

As
"may

in the Article 10(1) for stock acquisition, the Article 15(1) also

be," thereby implying that the Article 15(1)

market

is

merger

in question/'^

not restrained but there

The

in deciding

whether

to

applicable even if competition in a

a likelihood that competition will be in danger by the

Commission issued

Fair Trade

1980 to help

is

is

has the term

the guidelines for the

merger regulation

proceed against a merger or not/^^ According

in

to the

guidelines, if the value of the total assets of each of the companies intending to

consummate a merger

is 5

billion

yen or

less, generally, there is

not any examination

about the substance of the merger/^'^ This enforcement policy can be traced back to the

Japanese Government's intention to protect mergers consummated between small

companies/^''

On

the contrary, a merger will be closely

examined

if:

(1) the

market share of one

of the companies intending to effect a merge or the aggregate of the market shares of both

companies together

is

25%

or above; (2) one or both of the companies ranks

first in

market share and the difference between the top ranking and lower ranking companies
terms of market

companies

''"

/J. at

is

is

great; (3) the ranking in

market share of one or both of the merging

within the top three and the aggregate of the market shares of these three

127-28

'''

Id

'''*

Id the merger guideline

Companies.'

is

entitled 'Administrative

in this guidelines,

some general

tests are

mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate mergers.
"''

Id.

in

Procedure Standards for Examining Mergers,

announced and mergers

etc.

by

are classified into horizontal

Id.

Therefore, the Fair Trade Commission will only examine whether or not the parties are fulfilling the

reporting requirement of Article 15(2).

Id.
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amounts
the

to

50% or above;

merging companies belongs

companies
more.

is

above 10

number of competitions

(4) the

billion

is

in the

market

in

which one of

small; or (5) the total assets of one of the

yen and those of the other company

is

merging

10 billion yen or

431

Relevant Market Definition

The term

"particular field of Trade" used in the

merger regulation

relevant market including both product and geographical

market/"

It is

refers to the

necessary also in

AMA to determine a market in which ant-competitive conduct occurs.
For the product market definition, the most important criterion considered by the

Commission

is

substitutability

market definition, there

is

no standard

Fair Trade

when

the Fair Trade

retail

business, the Fair Trade

of a

city

to

Commission issued

would be considered

of products or services/" For the geographic

be applied uniformly to every case. However,

the guidelines

Commission announce

on mergers and acquisitions

that the administrative

in the

boundaries

as a geographic market in retail business except for the six

large cities for the purpose of reviewing mergers and acquisitions.''^''

'''

Id

"''

Id

*^'

Matsushita, supra note 395,

at

128-29.

^" Id
"" Id. the official

title

at

92-3.

of the Guidelines

is

"On Mergers and

Acquisitions

in Retail

Business"(1981).

Id.
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Procedural Issues

Filing Requirement

There are different

filing

requirements in each provision for different types of

concentration of economic power. For instance. Article 10 provides filing requirement for

stockholding by a company, Article 12 for interlocking directories. Article 14 for
stockholding by a person other than a company, and Article

1

5 provides for filing

requirement for mergers.

According

to the Article 15, every

in a merger, regardless

of its

size,

must

company

file

Japan which intends to be involved

in

a notification with the Fair Trade

Commission.''^^ Also, those companies which filed notifications with the

cannot effect their merger within 30 days from the date of complete
period

may

necessary

merger

be shortened, or extended up to sixty days,

.''^'

During

this

filing notification or

Trade Commission

'''

AMA,

"'^Mart

may

supra note 394.

yen.'*'*''

without observing the waiting period, the Fair

bring a suit to nullify the mergers at issue.^""

art.

Id. It is

15(2).

also required that the

changes the waiting period.

Commission acquire

Id.

^" Matsushita, supra note 395, at 129.
"" AMA, supra note 394, art 12.
18.

it

For companies which effect

15(3)

*'''

*'°/c/. art.

Commission deems

failure to file notifications. Failure to notify with the

punishable by a fine up to two million

mergers without

This waiting

"^^

There are penalties against

is

the

filing."*^^

waiting period, the Commission will examine whether or not the

at issue is in violation.

Commission

when

Commission

the consent of the

companies concerned when

it

77
If the Fair

Trade Commission finds sufficient reason

to suspect that the business

merger regulation, the Fair Trade Commission either

combination

at issue violates the

recommends

the parties concerned to take corrective measures or initiate the formal

hearing proceeding/'"

Article

the Fair Trade

of the stocks,

8 provides corrective measures for business combination. For instance,

1

Commission recommend

to transfer a part

the parties concerned to dispose the

of his business,

to resign

from

whole or

part

his position as an officer in

a company/''^ Furthermore, besides the measures introduced above, the Fair Trade

Commission may take any other measures
regulation/'*^ If the parties accept the

to eliminate the act in violations

of the

recommendation, the Fair Trade Commission

renders a decision without initiating a hearing procedure."'*'*

After a hearing procedure, the Fair Trade

parties to take corrective

measures provided

question. If the parties

going to

must do

is

that within thirty

file

^~
'''

Id. art.
Id. art.

is

7(2)

Id

^' Id

art.

48(4).

^' Id

art.

77.

"'"/J. art. 85.
447

Tokyo High
It

Court.'*'*^

seems

that

no challenge against those combinations, as

48.
1

1

Abir, supra note 290, at 171.

the concerned

7(2) or clear the act in

a suit against the decision by the Commission, they

of an unchallenged unlawful combination.

long as there

"'

in the Article

days from the date which the decision became

jurisdiction of the cases belong to the

fate

Commission may order

There

is

effective.'*"^

The

no mention of the

such combinations remain as

is

the case in South Korea.""^
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Penalties

.

There

acquisition provisions

imprisonment or

is

both.^^*

is

also penal provisions.

Any

act in violation

of the merger and

punishable by fine up to 2 mission yen, one year of

The

AML provides standing to bring suit for private parties

injured as a result of a violation of the regulation."''^ While the United States provides for

treble

damages, the damages

"**

AMA, supra note 394, art 9
"' Abir, supra note 290, at 7
1

450

Id.

1

1

in

Japan

is

limited to the actual damages.'''^
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This chapter

examined

is

devoted to comparative analysis of merger regulations which were

and

in the previous chapter

mainly focused on the

EC

to

concluding remarks. The comparison will be

and U.S. system not only because they have well developed

and considerably sophisticated regulations but also because both countries have been

more

active in applying their regulations, thereby controlling market concentration

caused by merger and acquisition.

EU
Korea

competition law which

MRFT Act,

antitrust law.'*^'

different rules

rules,

some

and Japan

is

AM A.

based on Article 85 and 86 of the

all

However, depending on

EC

of them were directly influenced by the U.S.
their differing purpose, they

evolved into having

and different interpretation of the regulation. For example,

social

and

in

applying the

political values has

played less important role in a United States

EU

we may

competition analysis than in a

the fact that the

Treaty, and

competition analysis, and

main concern of the U.S.

while the primar\' purpose of the

EU

antitrust

law

lied

find the reason from

more on pure competition

competition law was market integration rather than

pure competition.^'' In Korea and Japan, the governments main concerns were to build up
competitiveness of their industries rather than

"•
'

*-'

Abir, supra note 306,
Freret,

supra note

at

7. at

143-44.
144-45.

strictly controlling

market concentration

80
and

From

fair competition/'''

these discrepancy, the appHcation and interpretation of

merger regulation also have diverged.

The methods of measuring market concentrations
are

all

basically based

Agencies seem
In

to rely

are different,

on the market shares of the companies

more on economic

in a

even though they

market.

The U.S.

tools that the agencies of the other countries do.

European Community's experience, the lack of clear and objective analytical

criteria

has led to legal uncertainty in the Commission's decision as well as court's decision and

have been criticized by
There

when

the

is

FTC

scholars.'^'^

a big difference in the power of enforcement agencies. In United States,

and the

DOJ

is

going to block a merger, they have to proceed

seeking the a court decision.^'' The

need not proceed
Fair Trade

in court to

Commission

EC Commission,

in contrast to the

which

also render a decision

and order the concerned parties

failed to notify prior to the

consummation

information. Those agencies of both countries have to

at issue."''^

On

the contrary, even if a

company has

a pre-notification of their intention to merge, the

^''

See supra

"''

Opi, supra note 14,

"'^

See supra

text

See supra

text

'^*'

text

accompanying notes 359-61, 394-407.
at

274-280.

accompanying notes 302-5.
accompanying notes 59-64.
1

*" See supra text accompanying notes 382-84, 442-444.
""*

Sec supra

text

U.S. agencies,

block a merger."'^ Korea Fair Trade Commission and Japan

corrective measures provided in their regulations.^" Nevertheless, for

as ones

in the court,

accompanying notes 380, 384.

or

file

which

some mergers such

filed

an action

to take

wrong

to nullify the

mergers

already implemented a merger without

European Commission has power

to

81
require the post-merger

company

to

be separated or has the power to take any

appropriate measure necessary to restore the competition/^^

The EC Commission
them.''^°

initiate

On the

investigate only concentrations

which were informed

contrary, the enforcement agencies of the other three countries

an investigation on a concentration on their

own

decision

if

to

may

they believe the

concentration raises doubts/^'

Each regulation

pre-merger notification requirement and waiting period.

sets forth

Except in the European Community, the waiting period for the parties
days upon notification in the other three

Community

is

three

weeks upon

countries.''^^

to

The waiting period

request/^"* Exceptionally, the

merger
in

is

30

European

Japanese pre-merger

notification applies to all firms, regardless of their size or market shares."^'*

These waiting

periods allow the enforcement agencies to evaluate the transaction in question.

In conclusion, great similarity

is

found

in the

merger regulations of each countries

even though there are big and small differences. As a matter of fact, those regulations of

EU, Korea and Japan were modeled
However, there

more concerned with

is

after the

great difference in

United States merger regulation.

its

application. Since

Korea and Japan

are

the growth of their industr\\ they have not placed strong effort

enforcing regulations which control mergers as well as any other anti-competitive

behavior. These two countries have been keeping lenient application of their rules to

achieve their goals. European seemed to be more active

''^'^

See supra

text

^''"

See supra

text

accompanying notes
accompanying notes

'"''

Op\, supra noXQ 14,

"''

See supra

463

Merger Regulation, supra note

text

at

161.

145.

284.

accompanying notes 297, 377. 436.
1

,

art.

7(

1

).

in

applying their regulation.

on

82

compared

to

Korea and Japan,

their

primary was not

laid

on aggressively blocking

anti-

competitive behavior, rather laid on market integration. Therefor, the application of the

merger regulation

in

EU

has been looser than in the United States. The primar>' concern

of the United States merger regulations

is

to achieve

market through the aggressive application of its
States has been

mergers which

most aggressive

may be

its

goal of free competition in the

antitrust law.

in applying their

As

a result, the United

merger regulations, thereby blocking

substantially restrain the competition in a particular field of

market.

Perhaps, these differences in the manner of application, rather than in the measure

itself,

makes

it

much more

difficult for the

businessmen who are running

their business

across their borders to predict the outcome of their business behavior in another country.

No

less than

knowing

the regulation of other countries, an uniformed business regulation

including merger regulation, or negotiation or treaty

See supra

text

among

countries

is

accompanying notes 435.
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